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Abstract 
The Sudanese civil war which just ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was a conflict over recognition and opportunities between the 
center and the periphery, the centre being occupied by the elite of the North - Nile 
valley representing minority percentage of the entire population. It compounded 
issues of economic and political marginzalization where religion, race and ethnicity 
were politicized and manipulated. The legacy of colonial rule, the independence 
movement that followed and the inconsistent polices of nation-building thereafter are 
some of the factors which further shaped the center-periphery dichotomy. 
The first civil war (1955 - 1972) came to an end with the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. However, violation of the agreement eleven years later, in 1983, lead to 
the breakout of the second civil war (1983 - 2005) which only ended with the signing 
of the CPA. In addition to these agreements, there were a number of peace initiatives, 
internal and external, brokered to bring peace in the Sudan. 
As both civil wars have their own unique characteristics the agreements were also 
negotiated and signed under specific nature, conditions and circumstances. This paper 
will therefore look at the specifics of the Sudanese civil wars and subsequent peace-
making processes. The emphasis of the study will be on the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
signed in 1972 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. The 
overall objective of the research is to understand the factors and patterns of the 
Sudanese civil war and subsequent peace negotiation processes. 
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Chronology of Major Events 
1820-1881 Turko-Egyptian rule over the Sudan 
1881 - 1889 Mahdiyya rule 
1889 - 1956 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule 
1930 Announcement of Southern Policy 
1938 Graduates' Congress, led by General Secretary Ismail al-Azhari 
founded 
1943 Ansar and Khatmiyya sects formed 
1946 Reversal of Southern Policy of 1930 
1947 Juba Conference which for the first time brought Northern and 
Southern representatives, chiefs, prominent Arabs and British 
officials together to discuss new Southern Policy 
1948 Creation of 93 members Legislative Assembly in Khartoum 
1951 Appointment of a 13 member Constitutional Commission 
1952 Cairo Conference to discuss the nature of self-government for the 
Sudan. Representatives of Northern political parties, Britain and 
Egypt were present, while South was not represented 
1953 Self-government act 
Sudan's elections result in victory for the National Unionist Party 
(NUP) under the leadership of Ismail AI-Azhari 
1954 Opening of the 1 st Sudanese Parliament with AI-Azhari heading 
NUP government 
1955 NUP and AI-Azhari move from union with Egypt towards 
independence of Sudan 
Uprising in the South against Northern rule 
Parliament voted unanimously for independence 
Northern parties and government promised to consider federation as 
a solution to the Southern problem 
1956 Sudan became independent state 
Parliamentary appointment of a Constitutional Committee 
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1957 
1958 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1969 
1971 
43 Northerners and 3 Southerners 
Rejection of a federal arrangement by Northerners and withdrawal 
of Southerners from the Committee 
Federalism for South abandoned 
Military coup by Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud 
Suspension of provincial constitution and dismissal of Parliament 
Forced Islamization and Arabization of South Sudan nationals 
Formation of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) 
Launching of the Anya Nya guerrilla movement and declaration of 
total war against Northern troops in the South 
Fall of Gen. Abboud and appointment of Transitional Government 
led by Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifa 
Roundtable Conference on the problem of the Southern Sudan, with 
representatives of Southern and Northern parties 
Appointment of 12 man Committee to explore areas of 
constitutional compromise between North and South 
"May Revolution" successful coup led by Col. laafar Mohammed 
el-Nimeiri 
Declaration of policy of Regional Autonomy for Southern 
Provinces 
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) formed 
Secret negotiations begin 
Visit by delegation of WCC and AACC to explore ways toward 
reconciliation 
Abortive coup by SCP 
Appointment of Abel Alier as Minister of Southern Affairs and 
Vice President 
Lagu forms the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) 
Nimeiri becomes executive president 
Preliminary talks in Addis between SSLM and GoS 
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1972 Formal peace talks begin 
Addis Ababa Agreement signed 
Ceasefire 
Ratification of Peace Accord 
1973 Sudan's first Permanent Constitution is proclaimed 
Sudan becomes one-party state 
Southern autonomy confirmed 
Abel Alier becomes the president of Southern Regional Assembly 
1976 Attempted coup backed by Libya 
1978 Oil discovered by Chevron in Bentin in Southern Sudan 
National reconciliation agreement 
Appearance of SPLMlSPLA 
Presidential decree dividing south into 3 provinces 
Presidential decree introducing Islamic law 
Second Civil War erupts 
1985 Nimeiri is deposed by senior army officers who form the 
Transitional Military Council (TMC) under Lt. Gen. Abd ar 
Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab 
1986 Koka Dam Declaration 
1988 DUP negotiates with SPLA to begin a peace process 
1989 NIF led military coup overthrew the civilian government and 
installing a military regime once again. Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) established 
Bashir forms a government 
1991 SPLA splits into Torit and Nasir groups 
Clashes between the Torit and Nasir groups 
1992 National Transition Assembly formed - Bashir announced return to 
ci vilian rule 
Nigeria peace conference - Abuja I to unite Southern rebels 
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1993 SPLA-United formed 
Nigeria peace conference - Abuja II 
Sudan listed as state supporting international terrorism 
RCC dissolved; Bashir becomes president and Head of State 
1994 IGADD talks begin 
IGAD Declaration of Principles adopted 
1995 Opposition conference in Eritrea 
Attempt to assassinate Egyptian president 
Asmara Declaration of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
1996 UN Resolution condemns Sudan for terrorism 
1997 New chapter of cooperation - government signs Khartoum 
Agreement with Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) 
and other rebel groups in the south, leaving SPLM in isolation 
Government faces military losses and regional isolation and returns 
to IGAD talks 
US imposes sweeping economic sanctions on Sudan 
1998 New constitution endorsed 
US cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum 
1999 Bashir dissolves National Assembly and declares a state of 
emergency following power struggle with parliamentary speaker 
AI-Turabi 
Sudan begins to export oil 
2001 Popular National Congress (PNC) AI-Turabis' group signs MoU 
with SPLMI A. A day later, Turabi is arrested and placed under 
house arrest 
Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative establishes DOP 
2002 Key issues on religion and self-determination signed 
(Machakos Protocol) 
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2003 Talks resume. Plans also made for a separate symposium dealing 
with disputed border territories of Southern Blue Nile, Abyei and 
the Nuba Mountains 
Security deal signed in Naivasha 
Government releases Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi 
SPLMlA-United merges with SPLMlA 
GoS and SPLMI A negotiators agree in principle on sharing oil 
revenues 
2004 Protocol on wealth sharing is signed in Naivasha 
AI-Turabi arrested in Khartoum accused of plotting anti-
government coup since 2002 
Protocol on power sharing signed in Naivasha 
Protocol on the resolution of Abyei conflict 
Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Southern KordofanlNuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile States 
Parties pledge in front of the UN Security Council to end conflict by 
31 December 
Implementation Modalities of the Protocols signed 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed 
Donors pledge 4.5 billion for development and recovery programs 
in the South 
National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) was established 
GoS and exiled opposition grouping - NDA - sign reconciliation 
deal allowing NDA into power-sharing administration 
Government frees al-Turabi 
Garang sworn in as the first Vice President of the Sudan 
Abyei Boundary Commission Report released 
Interim constitution signed 
John Garang's death in a helicopter accident 
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Garang is succeeded by Salva Kiir 
Government of National Unity (GNU) composed of 14 parties is 
formed 
Presidential decree on the Technical Committee to draw the 1956 
border between North and South endorsed 
Interim Assembly of Southern Sudan is inaugurated 
Autonomous government - Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) 
is formed in the South. Administration is dominated by former 
rebels 
National Petroleum Commission established 
Judicial Service Commission Act approved 
Board of Directors of the Central Bank approved 
Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission 
(FFAMC) established 
President approved the establishment of the Constitutional Court 
and members were appointed through a presidential decree 
Joint Defence Board established 
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan signed 
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Introduction 
In August 1955, four months prior to independence, conflict broke out in the Sudan. The 
conflict developed into a long and bloody civil war which lasted for almost forty years. 
Sudan has existed as an independent state for fifty years and only experienced peace for 
eleven of those (1972 - 1983). The Sudanese civil war is one of the longest, most 
devastating and complex conflicts in Africa. The Sudan conflict has taken the form of 
two separate civil wars - the first from 1955 to 1972 and the second from 1983 to 2005. 
The years of conflict have been disastrous in both human and economic terms, with 
millions displaced and country's economy crippled. The Sudanese civil war has claimed 
the lives of millions of innocent citizens. Estimates show that the first civil war claimed 
the lives of about 500,000 people and more than a million Sudanese became refugees. l 
The second civil war claimed up to 2 million lives - from direct violence or war-induced 
disease and starvation. It internally displaced an additional four million Sudanese, and 
millions went into exile in neighbouring countries.2 
In discussions of civil war in Sudan, observers commonly use the terms 'North' and 
'South', to indicate regions involved in the conflict. In Sudanese terms, 'North' is used 
loosely to refer to the eastern, western, central and the northern regions of the country, 
while the term 'South' is used to describe the Southern region, including the three 
provinces of Bahr el Ghazel, Equatoria and Upper Nile. 3 [See Appendix 1]. 'North' 
therefore covers about two-thirds of the land mass and population. As it is common 
practice, this paper will also use these terms to describe these regions. 
The North-South dichotomy is shaped by the legacy of colonial rule, the independence 
movement that followed, and subsequent nation building processes characterized by 
inconsistent policies. The conflict in the Sudan is a reflection of socio-economic and 
political imbalance and inequality created and left by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
rule. Under colonial rule, development initiatives were focused in the North, particularly 
I Hizkias Assefa, "World Council of Churches Mediation and the Sudan Civil War, New Approaches to 
International Mediation", C.R Mitchell and K. Webb (ed.), Contributions in Political Science, Number 223, 
(New York Westport, Connecticut. London, 1988), 147. 
2 Emery Brusset, "Evaluation of Conflict Prevention Pools: Sudan". Department for International 
Development (DFlD), Evaluation Report EV 647, (Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC and 
Associated Consultants: March 2004), I. 
3 Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement." African Affairs, 76,303 
(Apr. 1977), 144. 
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along the River Nile. This policy subjected the rest of the country, including the South, 
to severe economic and political neglect. The 'Northern elite', who have dominated the 
political and economic platform since independence, originate from around the River 
Nile area. 
The socio-political structure introduced and left behind by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium rule created problems of social and regional inequality. Roads, schools 
and other infrastructure were built mainly along the Nile River where about five percent 
of the population reside. This area also had better education facilities, infrastructure and 
was developed economically while the rest of the country was neglected. Development 
initiatives were also focused in this area, while the rest of the country, particularly the 
South was severely underdeveloped. With the government based in the North, those 
included in the activities of the state were the educated elite from Khartoum and its 
surrounding areas. This situation inevitably led to a centre-periphery relationship that 
ultimately led to civil war. 
The 'North-South' terminology belies the fact that the trend of marginalization was not 
only limited to Southerners. The 'Black Book', anonymously released in 2000 and which 
is said to have triggered the recent Darfur conflict, tabulated the imbalances over the 
division of power since the 1950s.4 For example, for the period between 1954 and 1964, 
from the seventy-three ministerial positions at the central government, fifty-eight 
positions were occupied by members of Northern elite, twelve by Southerners and two 
from the central region. From 1964 to 1969 Northerners dominated in the government 
with sixty-seven point nine percent representation. The South had seventeen point three 
percent, central and western regions six point two percent each and the east two point 
zero-five percent representation. 5 Thus, inequity, injustice and lack of access to scarce 
resources was not limited to the South. Nevertheless, both instances of civil war broke 
out in the South and were led by Southern guerrilla movements. 
This mini-thesis will examme the Sudanese civil wars and subsequent peace-making 
processes. The emphasis of the study will be on two peace agreements namely, the Addis 
.j··Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace", International Crises Group, Policy Briefing, Africa 
Briefing, No. 32, 6 October 2005. 
5 The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan, 2000, 
http://www.sudanjcm.com/english/books/blackbookpart]/20040422bbone.htm [accessed 22 October 
2005] 
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Ababa Agreement, signed in 1972 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
signed in 2005. The overall objective of the research is to understand the factors and 
patterns which influenced the parties in the negotiation processes. 
Primary Research Question and Methodology 
The central research question of this mini-thesis is the following: What are the factors 
which influenced the parties to negotiate peace in the Sudan? Furthermore, what were the 
dynamics which contributed to the success or failure of the implementation of the 
agreements and the establishment of peace in the Sudan? 
Each chapter will address specific issues related to this research question. This approach 
is applied in order to help the reader understand the core issues involved in the civil war 
and to demonstrate the complexity of the conflict. 
Due to the nature of the thesis (mini-thesis), the research will depend heavily on 
secondary sources. The research is conducted in the form of a descriptive analysis with 
the characteristics of the agreements studied separately, rather than as a comparative 
study of the two agreements. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter one of this thesis will investigate the historical background and also identify the 
fundamental causes of the conflict. Although discussing the history of the Sudan is not 
the purpose of this paper, an awareness of the historical context is important in 
understanding the causes of the conflict, and its complexity and to appreciate the 
problems involved in the peace initiatives. 
Chapter two is devoted to the Addis Ababa Agreement and the conditions in which the 
agreement was negotiated and implemented. The first civil war (1955 to 1972) fought 
between the government and the Anya Nya (meaning "snake poison") lasted for about 17 
years. The role of the mediators in the peace process- the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) - is important and should not 
be overlooked. However, as Dunstan Wai has rightly observed, the most important 
question is "why did the Sudan government, after a period of bitter conflict in which it 
had invested considerable resources, change its policy and agree to terminate the war on 
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terms which throughout the period of fighting it had deemed unacceptable?,,6 This 
chapter will therefore investigate the factors which brought the parties to the negotiating 
table. 
The Addis Ababa agreement addressed a number of critical issues and succeeded in 
ending the conflict. However, the agreement fell short of sustaining peace, and conflict 
erupted again in 1983. It is therefore important to understand at what point the agreement 
failed and why. 
Reflecting on the prevIOUS chapter, chapter three exarrunes the developments which 
emerged in the early 1980's leading to the second civil war. It also identifies the internal, 
regional and international dynamics around the conflict. While the South was again 
leading the resistance movement, the overall objectives of those involved, and the nature 
in which the war was conducted were different. In this regard, the chapter will look at the 
different factors which led to the next phase of the conflict and the peace-making process 
that followed. Like the Addis Ababa Agreement, it is crucial to look at the political 
dynamics of the time and also to understand how the negotiation process as well as the 
actual peace process was influenced. 
Chapter four will focus on the different peace talks which led to' the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The political dynamics, the nature and ideology 
of the parties and the regional and international dimension to the conflict are all pertinent 
factors which make the second civil war different from the first. This chapter will 
examine the salient features of the CPA and try to identify whether it has addressed the 
root causes of the conflict. 
The conclusion will discuss the salient features of peace-making and negotiations in the 
Sudan. It will also highlight the main arguments of the different chapters and 
contextualize the findings in relation to the research question and the dynamics of 
political developments in the Sudan. 
6 Dunstan. M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, (New York, London: African Publishing 
Company. 1981), 162. 
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Chapter 1 
Historical Background to the Sudan Conflict 
Introduction 
The Sudan conflict is understood and portrayed by scholars in different ways. Dunstan 
Wai describes it as an Arab-African conflict rooted in Arab versus African nationalism, 
in which Northerners identify with the Arabs and Southerners with 'Negroid' Africans.7 
Francis Deng and Ann Lesch argue that it is a conflict of 'national identity' with race, 
religion, culture and ethnicity at the root of the problem.8 Some say it is a religious war 
between Muslims and followers of indigenous beliefs or Christians.9 Parties involved in 
the conflict have their own analyses of the root cause of the conflict. On the one hand, the 
government sees it as a Southern problem caused by international interference while rebel 
groups see it as rooted in ethnicity and religion. 10 
This chapter will assess the root causes of the Sudan conflict. Although the above 
interpretations all have an element of truth, these factors do not entirely explain the 
fundamental causes of the civil war in the Sudan. The root causes of the Sudan conflict 
lie in colonialism and its legacy in Sudanese society. Ethnicity, race, religion and identity 
were often tools used by the colonial powers to manipulate the political, economic and 
social balance in the Sudan. The perspective of this chapter will be to show how Wai's, 
Deng's and Lesch's arguments illuminate some of the causes of the conflict but not 
necessarily the root cause. 
7 Ibid. I 
8 See Francis Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, (Washington DC: the Brookings 
Institution, 1995) and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, (Oxford: James 
Currey, 1998). 
9 Country Profile: Sudan, BBC News [Online]. Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.ukJ2/hi/rnidd1e easUcountry profiles/8208b·btm [accessed July II, 2006] . Douglas 
Johnson in his book 'The Root Causes of the Sudan Civil War" and Emeric Rogier in "No More Hills 
Ahead? The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace" have also made reference to such description of 
the war. 
10 See "Conflict Resolution in Sudan: Stakeholder Perspectives" in Korwa G. Adar, etal (eds.), Sudan 
Peace Process Challenges and Future Prospects, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), p. 22 -
57 
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Colonialism and its Legacy 
In explaining the origins of the conflict in the Sudan two distinct approaches are 
commonly used. The first explanation sees the conflict as a continuation of confrontation 
between two different cultures - 'Arab culture' and 'African culture'. This explanation 
sees 'communal cleavage' between the two communities as leading to an African-Arab 
schism which became the fundamental problem that beset the Sudan. I I 
In the context of the Sudan, the term 'Arab' does not necessarily mean the Arab race 
found in the Middle East or North Africa. The' Arab' groups in the Sudan are mixed with 
'African' races to varying degrees - less so in the central Nile valley than in Darfur or 
Kordofan. 12 These groups are predominantly found in the North - in Khartoum, Blue 
Nile, Kordofan and the Northern Provinces. 13 
The population in Northern part of the county is generally identified as 'Arab' in terms of 
"racial" classification and Islam is the dominant religion in the region. However, it is 
important to note that the Beja tribe in Kassala and the Westerners (i.e. west Africans 
claiming Sudanese status) in Darfur do not claim to be 'Arabs,' even though they identify 
with Islam. The population of the Southern regions who are mainly Nilotics and Nilo-
Hamites, are racially 'African' and are predominantly followers of indigenous belief. 
About five percent of this popUlation, mainly the political elite, practice Christianity.14 
(For clarity on regional and provincial groupings see Appendix 1.) 
The second approach explains the conflict as a consequence of Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium rule which created the 'Northern' and the 'Southern' regions through 
artificial boundaries. 15 This refers to the British policy of indirect rule through tribal 
chiefs and to the Closed District Ordinance which separated the two regions, leading to a 
situation where the North developed socio-economically and politically at the expense of 
the South. 
It is important to note that the term 'North' in the literature on Sudan is loosely used and 
II Wai, The African-Arab, 16. 
12 Emeric Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, Clingendael Security Paper No. I, August 2005, p. 6. 
13 The only group which has not mixed is the Rashaida group who settled in the East in the 1870's 
1-1 Wai, The African-Arab, 19 
15 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), xiii 
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refers to the eastern, western, central and Northern regions which represent about two-
thirds of the land mass and the population. The 'South' refers to what is known as the 
Southern region and includes the three provinces of Bahr el Ghazel, Equatoria and Upper 
Nile. 16 For the sake of consistency, this paper will also follow such referencing. 
The concepts used in both explanations for the conflict include exploitation, cultural and 
religious assimilation, slave-raiding and economic and social injustice committed against 
marginalized people. Religion and ethnicity have also been identified as factors in the 
cause of the conflict. 
When Francis Deng talks about the issue of 'national identity' being the root cause of the 
problem he takes the above concepts into account. Identity, as defined by Deng, is 'a 
function of how people identify themselves and are identified [by others] in race, 
ethnicity, culture, language, and religion,.17 Ethnic identification can be a source of 
conflict once it is politicized. Deng maintains that the 'context in which one's identity is 
used as a weapon to oppress includes denial of recognition, exclusion ... marginalization 
and even the threat of cultural annihilation or physical elimination' as a result of one's 
identity, could be a source of conflict. 18 Thus, once the concept of identity is 
manipulated it becomes a source for a power struggle. 
Sudan has a population estimated at about forty-one million. The majority (fifty-two 
percent) of the population claim to be 'African,.19 However, the dominant culture has 
been the' Arab' culture. Over half of the population speaks Arabic as their mother tongue 
while the rest including the Southern Sudanese, use Arabic, or a pidgin form of it as a 
lingua franca. 20 The religious make-up of the country is thus: Sunni Muslim account for 
seventy percent of the population (mostly in the North), while twenty-five percent of 
popUlation, mainly in the South, follow indigenous beliefs and about five percent practice 
Christianity.21 Out of the seventy percent Muslim popUlation, fifty-seven percent see 
16 Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement." African Affairs, 76,303 
(Apr. 1977), 144. 
17 Francis Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, (Washington DC: the Brookings 
Institution, 1995), 11. 
18 Deng, War of Visions, 11. 
19 CIA: The World Fact Book [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cia.!!ov!ciaJpublications/factbook/print/su.html[April 20, 2006]. 
10 Muddathir Abd ai-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and 
Political Development, 1899-/956, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969),5 
11 CIA: The World Fact Book [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cia.gov/ciaJpublications/factbookJprint/sll.html[ 2006. April 20] 
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themselves as 'Arab' and forty-three percent as African .. Arabic and Dinka are the two 
major languages spoken,. There are fourteen other languages, divided into some 100 
dialects, half of which are spoken in Southern Sudan.22 
The identity factor which Deng defines as a source of conflict is linked to differences in 
race, culture and religion which create differing views concerning the future of the 
country. According to Deng, such differences lead to a 'War of Vision', where different 
factions have conflicting ideas on the future of the country. This is also related to Wai's 
notion of an Arab-African conflict, which he sees as rooted in 'Arabism' versus 
'Africanism' .23 
Issues of national and ethnic identity, politicized by the colonial powers, is not supported 
as a main cause of the conflict if one takes into account that Sudan is politically and 
economically dominated by a minority group. This dominant group represents about five 
point three percent of the population while the majority (about eighty percent) of the 
population are at the periphery. 24 
The First Period of Colonial Rule (1820-1881) 
When Egypt's ruler, Muhammad Ali invaded Bilad aI-Sudan (land of the Blacks) - what 
is more or less present-day Sudan - in 1820 he planned it with three objectives which are 
related to political, military and economic interests. His political objective was to invade 
Sudan in order to expand Turko-Egyptian international power in the region.25 Militarily, 
Sudan represented a stable supply of strong slaves for Egypt's army, and economically 
Sudanese gold, ivory and other precious metals would be welcome additions to the 
E · ')6 gyptlan treasury.-
Ali's army first conquered Northern Sudan which was almost completely Islamized and 
Arabized.27 The cultural and religious similarities among the populations made it easy for 
the colonizers to use the peoples of Nubia, Sennar, Kordofan and the Red Sea to 
22 Johnson, The Root Causes, p.1 
23Wai, The African-Arab, I 
2,\ According to the Black Book, five point three percent of Sudan's population is represented at seventy-
nine point five percent at executive and ministerial posts in Khartoum. 
25 Peter Woodward, Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 
Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1990), 13. 
26 Wai, The African-Arab, 26. 
27 Abd aI-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 7. 
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collaborate in slave-raids directed at non-Muslims in the hinterlands of the White Nile 
and the Nuba Mountains. The Turko-Egyptian army broke through the Sudd swamps and 
penetrated into the South of the region, which opened up commercial opportunities for 
European, Egyptian and Northern Sudanese merchants to trade.28 The North became a 
base for carrying out operations to the South. From the hinterlands of the White Nile and 
the Nuba Mountain alone, about ten thousand slaves were exported to Egypt annually.29 
By the 1840's slave trade became increasingly profitable, and the Southern Sudanese 
became the victims of merciless traders who were brutal in their dealings with the local 
people. By breaking through the Sudd, the Turkiyya altered the political and economic 
status quo between the North and the South. As it was forbidden for Muslims enslave 
other Muslims, slave raids to the non-Muslim South continued on a massive scale. 3o This 
marked the beginning of the North-South division in the Sudan. 
Wai, Deng and Lesch agree that the Sudanese civil war was initiated by factors that go as 
far back as the first colonial rule. In his book 'The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars' 
Douglas Johnson also makes reference to colonialism as an historical factor which helped 
to trigger the civil war. 31 The South was initially unaffected by political events in the 
North but became a victim once the Turko-Egyptian armies expanded southward. 
The first attempt to form a central administration in the Sudan occurred during Turko-
Egyptian rule. 32 The territorial unity of the North and South was imposed by conquest 
and maintained by force. The new administration destroyed the domains of indigenous 
kingdoms such as Dar Fur and Sennar, and imposed a central authority which ruled from 
Khartoum. 33 The infrastructural developments introduced during this period encouraged 
economic growth. These included administrative structures, schools, communications, 
and security, mainly around Khartoum. 34 However, such limited development 
strengthened the position of those at the centre (i.e. central riverin Sudan) at the expense 
of the peripheries. 35 Hence, riverin Sudan became the centre of administration while the 
28 Johnson, The Root Causes,,5. 
29 Abd ai-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 14. 
311 Abd ai-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 14. 
31 Johnson, The Root Causes, xviii . 
. 12 Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, (Oxford: James Currey, 1998),26. 
33 Sharif Harir, "Recycling the Past in the Sudan", in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt eds., Short-Cut to Decay: 
The Case of the Sudan (UppsaJa:Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), 23. 
3~ Lesch, The Sudan, 27. 
35 Harir, Recycling the Past, 30. 
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peripheries, including the South, West and East were economically and politically 
marginalized. This was only the beginning of the separate development of the regions, 
which in the long run led to 'structural contradiction' in the Sudan. 
The government introduced a new form of taxation, which impoverished some areas of 
Northern Sudan, and the Northerners slave raiding increased. 36 The Shariqiyya, from 
north of Khartoum, the Rufa' a of the Blue Nile, and the Baqqara along the White Nile 
and in the west became involved in official raids with the army and also organized raids 
of their own. 37 Cattle raiding, plundering of foodstuff and seizing slaves were common 
practice. As the momentum of the slave trade increased, slaves were used not only in the 
army, but as agricultural labourers, servants, cooks, blacksmiths and construction 
workers. 
From the Southern perspective, those who invaded the South, including Muslim 
merchants from the North, Egyptians and European traders were as responsible as the 
Turko-Egyptian conquerors for destroying the livelihood in the South.38 Slave-raiding 
reached its peak in the 1870s and overwhelmed and devastated the Southern societies. 
Northern slave traders particularly the riverin merchants, including Zubeir Pasha Rahma, 
who was appointed Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal in 1873, enjoyed the support of central 
government. Slave-trading was seen by the government as one of the objectives of 
invading the Sudan in the first place. 
The historical processes which separated the North and the South of the country therefore 
began during the Turko-Egyptian rule. Though Islam came to the Sudan around the 
seventh century, the effect of Arabization and Islamization was only felt after the Turko-
Egyptian rule forced Northerners to participate in the slave raids. Once Khartoum - a 
riverin city - became the capital city of the Sudan in 1833 a pattern of centre-periphery 
relations was reinforced, wherin the Centre (riverin Sudan and its immediate 
surroundings) was politically and economically dominant, while the rest of the country, 
including the Kassala, Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan and Southern region was 
marginalised. The political consequence was felt once the economic and political pattern 
started to develop in a discriminatory way. This was just the beginning of a long-term 
political situation, in existence by the time Sudan was conquered for the second time, this 
36 Johnson. The Root Causes, 5. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Lesch, The Sudan, 27 
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time by Anglo-Egyptian joint rule. 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule 1898 -1956 
One of the causes of the conflict in Sudan was the British administration's attempt to 
separate the North and the South through an 'artificial boundary'. The Anglo-Egyptian 
alliance conquered Sudan after defeating the Mahdist army in 1898.39 Even though the 
condominium rule was a system of shared governance between Britain and Egypt, the 
latter's presence was nominal as it was under British protection. 
Britain sought control over the Sudan because, byy virtue of its proximity to Egypt and 
the Suez Canal and as the source of the greater Nile River, Sudan's geopolitical setting 
made it an important territory both economically and politically. In addition to being an 
important trading route for both Egypt and Britain, Egypt's welfare depended on the Nile 
water which runs through the Sudan.4o During the 'Scramble for Africa' in the 1880s the 
country was seen as strategically important, and attracted the interest of Belgium and 
France.41 
Conquest followed distinctly different patterns in the North and in the South. In the 
North, the cultural and religious similarity with Egypt made it easier for the Northern 
Sudanese to accept the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule, whereas in the South, 
resistance was shown to the colonial rule until 1930' S.42 While the colonial 
administration invested considerably in the political, economic, social and cultural 
development of the North, the South remained isolated and underdeveloped.43 In the 
North, the government financed social service projects, such as schools and hospitals, 
throughout the 1930s. In the South, the government had limited objectives - the 
establishment and maintenance of law and order while defending its own position in the 
face of tribal unrest.44 
The pattern of playing-off the centre against the periphery was repeated under the 
Condominium rule. By consolidating the central administration in Khartoum, as it was 
the case under the Turko-Egyptian rule, the Governor-General of the Sudan isolated the 
39 The present boundaries of the Sudan were formed in 1916 once Darfur came under British occupation. 
-II) Abd ai-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 24. 
41 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 33. 
-12 Abel Alier, "The Southern Sudan Question" in Dunstan M. Wai ed., The Southern Sudan: The Problem 
of National Integration. (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 13. 
-13 Deng, War of Visions, II. 
-1-1 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 37. 
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administration from the South both in terms of physical distance and its guiding 
preoccupations.45 This again left the South and other marginalized areas on the periphery 
of central governments concern.46 
In the South and in some areas in the Nuba Mountains there was little assimilation of 
indigenous structures into the administration. This was mainly due to the lack of 
organized executive authorities or tribal chiefs.47 To strengthen its political and material 
base the administration sought friendly and collaborative tribal chiefs.48 To establish its 
authority, the administration exercised indirect rule through what was known as native 
administration, which delegated administrative functions to the tribal chiefs of the various 
communities whenever possible.49 To ensure compliance, the British administration 
established tribal chief's among those who were in contact with the Northern riverin 
society and had acquired knowledge of the Arabic language and trade. 50 
In the North, families who held authority under Turko-Egyptian rule were re-instated as 
part of the government bureaucracy. Key influential Sufi Islamic families like the 
Khatmiyya who originated with Muhammad Utham al-Mirghani (1793-1853) were given 
positions in the government.51 The British also allowed the 'posthumous son of the 
Mahdi,' Sayyid Abdal-Rahman al-Mahdi, who was also from the Sufi brotherhood, to 
collect zakat (Islamic tithes) from its followers and to develop profitable pump-irrigated 
cotton schemes on Aba Island and in the Gezira district.52 Mahdi followers were mainly 
from the west. The economic and political power of these families increased under 
British rule and later became a strong political movement. 
Throughout the first phase of the condominium rule, from 1899 to 1919, which PM Holt 
and MW Daly called the period of 'pacification and consolidation' ,53 the policy of the 
government towards the Southern provinces was largely passive or laissez-faire. 54 The 
45 Johnson, Root Causes, 10. 
46 Ibid. 10-1 1. 
47 Ibid~ 12. 
48 Yoshiko Kurita, "The Social Bases of Regional Movements in Sudan: 1960s-1980s" in Katsuyoshi Fukui 
and John Markakis (eds.), Ethnicity & Conflict in the Hom of Africa, (London: James Currey, Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1994),203. 
49 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 34. 
50 Kurita, The Social Bases, 203-204. 
51 Lesch. The Sudan, 26. 
52 Ibid. 29. 
53 PM Holt and MW Daly, A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, Firth 
edition (England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 101. 
54 Abd-a\ Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 71. 
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colonial authorities restricted their role in the area to the maintenance of law and order 
and the provision of different forms of assistance to Christian missionary societies. 
However, during the second phase - post Egyptian revolution of the early 1920' s - the 
government became increasingly active and interventionist, especially after the uprising 
of the White Flag League - a manifestation of Sudanese Nationalism - in 1924 which the 
British and tribal chiefs, including al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani saw as a damaging to their 
indirect rule and the established social order. 55 
It was in this spirit that the colonial rule introduced the Closed District Ordinance in the 
1920s and regulated the movement of non-native persons in the South. 56 The Passports 
and Permits Ordinance of 1922 made Southern Sudan off limits to all non-African 
Sudanese and also limited Southerners from travelling to the North. The Southern Policy 
introduced in 1930 officially barred Northerners from the South and created a social and 
commercial barrier between the two populations. 57 
The decision to administer the North and South separately reinforced Arabism and Islam 
in the North. At the same time Christian missionary education of the population was 
encouraged in the South.58 The activities of the Christian missionary societies were also 
sought to help win the confidence and support of Southern inhabitants. 59 
The Southern Policy 
Although cultural and religious differences between the Southern and Northern provinces 
existed, the basic considerations which dictated the government's Southern policy were 
the colonial interests of the British Empire in the Sudan and in East Africa.6o Broadly, the 
British wanted to keep Arab and Islamic influences out of East Africa.61 The government 
therefore encouraged the establishment of western institutions, Christianity in 
particular.62 Through its separation policy the government "aimed not at creating a non-
Islamic culture, but an anti-Islamic one".63 
55 Lesch, The Sudan, 30. 
56 Johnson, Root Causes, 12. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Deng, War of Visions, 11. 
59 Abd-al Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 72. 
60 Ibid. 71. 
61 Lesch, The Sudan, 32. 
62 Dunstan M. Wai, "Pax Britannica and the Southern Sudan: The View from the Theatre." African Affairs. 
79,316 (July 1980),379. 
63 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, 'Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa', Africa 
Affairs. 89,356 (July 1990). 372. 
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Having lost America as a source of raw material (cotton) for their textile industry, the 
British saw Sudan's potential in meeting the demand. The British began developing the 
Gezira cotton plantation, south of Khartoum, and also established a railway line in the 
North for transporting cotton from Gezira and manufactured products imported from 
Britain.64 The British did not see the South as a source of raw materials or even a market 
for finished products. Hence, there was no incentive for them to invest in the 
administrative, educational or economic development of the region.6s 
The alleged reason behind the Southern Policy was to protect the South from the North's 
religious influence and dominance.66 However, it would be difficult to defend the way in 
which this policy was implemented. The prohibition of the Arabic language, the abolition 
of Arab names, the wholesale accusations against all Northerners for being slave dealers, 
and the advantage given to Christian missionaries over Muslim preachers made the policy 
seem discriminatory.67 
The Southern Policy of the British administration was successful in ending slavery in the 
South as interaction between the people of the North and the South was discouraged.68 
However, the Southern policy did not strive to bring social and economic progress in the 
South to match the growth in the North. The policy led to the development of a different 
political, economic and social trajectory which widened the North-South dichotomy.69 
The decision to administer the two regions separately reinforced Arabism and Islam in 
the North, while the introduction of Christian missionary education and the English 
language further separated the South.7o This difference opened options that the South 
would either develop into a separate territorial and political entity or eventually be 
integrated into what was then British East Africa (namely, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, 
including Zanzibar). However, these anticipated events never took place and the South 
was faced with enormous challenge of competing with the Northern region which was 
64 Hizkias Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies - The Sudan Conflict. Boulder, 
(London: Westview Press, 1987),44. 
65 Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 44. 
66 Lesch, The Sudan, 31-32. 
67 Alier, The Southern Sudan, 15. 
68 M.A. Mohamed Salih, 'The Ideology of the Dinka and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement" in 
Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, eds., Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (London: James 
Currey, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 195. 
69 Lesch, The Sudan, 31-32. 
70 Deng, War of Visions, 11. 
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relatively advanced and developed. Though Britain revised its policy of separate 
development in 1946, it neither had the time nor the will to make proper constitutional 
71 
arrangements on the future of the South. 
The realities of post-independence confirmed the difficulty of uniting two regions with 
very different levels of development. A situation of centre-periphery relations where the 
former is in full control and the latter is in full subordination was inevitable. The divisive 
Turko-Egyptian rule and Britain's policy of separate administration led to unequal 
development in terms of distribution of wealth, administrative role in the government as 
well as general participation in the economy. These are some of the factors which 
triggered the conflict in 1955. 
Sudanese Nationalist Movement leading to Independence 
Anglo-Egyptian rule set the political milieu of post-independence Sudan. It was during 
this time that Sudanese nationalism matured, the major political parties formed and 
preparation for independence began. The rise of the educated 'Northern elite' who were 
at the forefront of the nationalist movement also began during this time. 
Sudanese Nationalism 
The White Flag League, influenced by the Egyptian nationalist movement, began the 
push for independence in the 1920's. The Graduates' General Congress (GGC), founded 
by Ismail al-Azhari in 1938, continued the movement for political rights, including the 
right to self-determination, the right to establish a Sudanese representative body, the 
establishment of a Higher Education Council, judicial reform and educational and 
economic upliftment.72 This small but vocal urban educated class in the North gradually 
became the 'unofficial' voice representing Northern Sudanese attitudes.73 There was no 
similar Southern voice at this point. 
Internal tension between unionists and separatists split the Congress. The split also 
reflected sectarian interests, in which al-Mirghani and the Khatmiyya family tacitly 
71 Deng, War of Visions, 11. 
72 Lesch, The Sudan, 30. 
73 Mansour Khalid, The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution, 
(London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990), 43. 
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supported the Ashiqqa party led by al-Azhari who was pro-unity with Egypt, while the 
Ansar sect, led by the Mahdi family were for an independent and separate Sudan. This 
eventually led to the creation of two of the strongest sectarian parties - the National 
Unionist Party (NUP), later known as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of the al-
Mirghani family and the Umma party of the Mahdi family. Internal divisions on the 
future of Sudan undermined the movement, as the issue of self-determination revolved 
around who would inherit the instruments of state.74 
From the GCC also emerged a group known as the 'Northern elite'. The term 'Northern 
elite' refers to a group of western educated riverin elite, who trace their roots to religious 
or secular families such as the Ansar and Khatmiyya.75 These groups of people who 
represent only about 5.3% of the population have since dominated the socio-economic 
and political spheres through the Umma party, the DUP and other major parties including 
the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and the National Islamic Front (NIF).76 
Other parties also emerged in the 1940s. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) was one of 
them. The SCP, which emerged from Marxism imported from Egypt introduced new 
ideologies and also protest strategies such as mass demonstrations, strikes and petitions.77 
Road to Independence 
Responding to pressure from the North, the British laid plans to merge the Northern and 
Southern regions .. In 1943, before the Southern Policy was changed, the British created 
an Advisory Council with the objective of establishing a legislative assembly whose 
jurisdiction would encompass the entire country.78 Members of the council however, 
were only drawn from the Northern region. 
The reversal of the Southern Policy in 1946 was followed by a conference which brought 
together representatives from the North and the South to discuss the future of the Sudan. 
The Juba Conference held in 1947 was also the first time Southerners were invited to a 
consultative process dealing with the future of the Sudan. It was therefore, the British 
administration's first attempt at safeguarding the future interest of the South in a united 
Sudan even though it was likely that the region would suffer from the consequence of the 
74 Johnson, The Root Causes, 128. 
75 R. S. O'Fahey. "Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan." Journal of Religion in Africa. XXVI. 3 (1996),261. 
76 The Black Book 
77 Khalid, The Government, 85. 
78 Lesch, The Sudan. 34. 
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previous policy of isolation.79 
However, Southern representatives at the Juba Conference were hand-picked from among 
those who were on the administration's payroll, such as tribal chiefs, junior officials or 
police officers.8o The central concern of the meeting was the establishment of a 
Legislative Assembly with Southern representation. 81 The new Southern Policy 
emphasised unity with the North, while the previous policy was about keeping the two 
regions separate. 
The conference was also about transitional measures to accelerate the political and 
economic integration of the South at a national level. In other words, Britain was 
preparing the Southern region for independence. Initially, representatives of the South 
opposed self-government or the independence of the Sudan.82 While accepting the 
principle of the conference, Southerners expressed the need for more time to strengthen 
their educational and economic systems before uniting with the North. The Southern 
representatives expressed need for the protection inherent in a federal system, revealed 
their concerns about the power imbalance that existed between the two regions. At the 
Juba conference they requested guarantees of progress and the preservation of Southern 
identity in a united Sudan.83 
However, lack of consensus from within weakened the Southern position. Civil servants 
favoured immediate participation in the Legislative Assembly and argued that "the best 
way in which the Southerners could protect themselves would be to go to Khartoum now 
to legislate together with the Northerners .... In spite of their backwardness ... 
Southerners must defend themselves and speak and think for themselves".84 On the other 
hand, tribal chiefs insisted that they stick to their original request for more time and not 
change their position which would be a violation of the mandate given to them by the 
people.85 
79 Francis Deng, 'Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan's Conflict of Identities'; in I. William Zartman ed., 
"Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars", (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995),89. 
80 Assefa, _Mediation ofCivi(Wars, 49. 
81 Woodward, Sudan 1898-1989,72. 
82 Abd aI-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 133. 
83 Lesch, The Sudan, 34. 
84 "Proceedings of the Juba Conference," in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan: The Problem of 
National Integration, (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 185-188. 
85 Deng, Negotiating a Hidden Agenda, 85. 
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93 seats) of the seats was allocated to the South. In the thirteen members Constitutional 
Amendment Commission established in 1951 only one representative was from the South 
and the impact of this was felt when the South lost the vote for a federal system.85 
Southern exclusion from decision making was further evidenced when no Southerners 
were called to join the delegation that went to Cairo in 1952 and 1953 to decide whether 
the country should become an independent state or merge with Egypt. 86 Present at the 
meeting were representatives of the British and Egyptian administrations and the 
Northern political parties, but that pivotal meeting excluded Southern representation. 
The process of Sudanization - handing over of the civil service to Sudanese officials -
announced in 1954, appointed only six Southerners to administrative positions out of 
eight hundred posts - about zero point seven-five percent of the jobs Sudanized.87 Out of 
the six appointed the highest post was an Assistant District Commissioner position and 
no Southerns were appointed as governors, deputy governors or at district commissioner 
level. This is often justified with reference to the Southerner's lack of seniority, 
experience and education, as well as the lack of Southerners with fluency in Arabic, 
which directly favours Northerners. 
Self government came to the Sudan very much as a surprise to both the North and the 
South. Jeppie quotes Daly in saying, ' ... a target date of 1965 was presumed for 
independence ... ' .88 However, the outcome of the Second World War as well as the 
regional and local environment left the British with no choice but to begin preparing 
Sudan for self rule. 
The first parliamentary election held in 1953 brought al-Azhari's National Unionist Party 
(NUP) into government with fifty-one seats followed by the Umma party with twenty-
two seats, while the Southern Party - later renamed the Liberal Party -won nine seats.89 
A self-Governance Statute which called for a referendum on independence or union with 
Egypt was published the same year. However, in October 1955 the NUP and Umma 
bypassed the Statute and agreed to move towards independence, speeding the adoption of 
the transitional constitution, a revised version of the 1953 act, and Sudan became an 
85 Lesch, The Sudan, 43. 
86 Ibid. 35. 
87 Wai, The African-Arab, 56. 
88 Shamil Jeppie, Sharia and State in the Sudan: from Late Colonialism to Late lslamism, (Oxford, 
Somerville College and OCIS, --------), 9 
89 Lesch, The Sudan, 35. 
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independent state on 1 January 1956.90 
Southern politicians accepted independence on condition that federal status is granted to 
the three Southern provinces (Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile). A clause which 
reads ' ... claims of the Southern Members of Parliament for federal government in the 
three Southern provinces be given full consideration ... ' was inserted in the 
Independence Resolution and Southerners supported the motion for independence as well 
as the Transitional Constitution.91 
To the surpnse of Southerners in the parliament, the newly established National 
Constitutional Committee, which consisted of 46 members, out of which only 3 were 
from the South, rejected the provision for federal arrangement. In December 1957 
Premier Abd Allah Khalil (1956 - 1958) rejected the possibility of Sudan becoming a 
federal state.92 This attitude led the few Southern representatives who joined the 
government to quit, leaving the central government an opportunity to openly impose its 
policies on the rest of the nation. 
The South's resistance toward independence came to be justified as the subregion's 
economic neglect became obvious. By the end of the condominium period 56% of all 
investment was concentrated in Khartoum, Kassala and the Northern Province which 
together had a population of about 2.3 million. In contrast, 17% of investment was in the 
Darfur and Kordofan provinces, which had a population of 3 rnillion.93 The socio-
economic gap between the centre and periphery continued well into the post-
independence period. 
Khalil's failure in settling the issues which emerged out of independence led to a military 
coup in 1958 led by General Aboud. Once Aboud (1958-64) took over power, he 
suppressed all political parties and multi-party activities. Aboud refused to accept that 
there was a Southern constitutional problem, His severe reprisals against dissent affected 
civilian population. Aboud's regime forcefully imposed the process of Islamization and 
Arabization on the. 94 
91l Abd ai-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 215. 
91 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 69-70. 
92 Edgar O'ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000),15. 
93 Gerard Prunier, Daifur: An Ambigous Genocide, (London: Hurst & Co., 2005), 33. 
9.\ Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 61. 
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Status of Islam and Sharia Law in the Sudan 
Since the first parliamentary election, two of the most contentious issues in the country 
have been the status of the South and the relation between state and religion. Since 
independence relations between the government and those at the periphery have been 
challenged by these two factors. Resistance to religious domination was a source of 
conflict, not just in the South, but also in other marginalized provinces of Darfur, 
Kassala, Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Muslims who preferred non-theocratic secular 
government were also excluded and marginalized from the mainstream of political 
.. . 95 partIcIpation. 
As part of indirect rule, the Anglo-Egyptian rule consciously institutionalized Islamic 
policy in the Sudan.96 Instituting Sharia meant that the colonial administration had 
accepted Islam as a religion in the Sudan, even though it did so for strategic reasons. Fear 
of Mahdist revivals and religious elite who could easily be mobilised against foreign 
conquest was the primary reason.97 
Although Islam was implicit in Northern Sudanese nationalist discourse since 1920s, 
political Islam (lslamism) as an ideology was not the focus. 98 It is therefore important to 
make a distinction between those who practice the religion (Muslims) and Islamists. Sean 
O'Fahey explains Islamism in the context of Sudan as a local expression of the Islamic 
rebirth and determination to establish a social and political order based upon God's 
revelation.99 
Political movements among the Northern Sudanese as they emerged in the 1930s and 
1940s, for example the Umma party or the NUP, were based on ethnic and family 
allegiance and not on religion. lOO The processes of Islamization and Arabization during 
Abboud's regime was a means to create national unity and less to do with political 
ideology. Abboud made Arabic compulsory in schools throughout the country and 
95 Johnson, The Root Causes, 128. 
96 O'Fahey, Islam and Ethnicity, 260. 
97 Jeppie, Sharia and State, 5. 
98 Jeppie, Sharia and State, 8. 
99 O'Fahey, Islam and Ethnicity, 259. 
\(Xl O'Fahey, Islam and Ethnicity, 261. 
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changed the weekly holiday in the South from Sunday to Friday. 101 By 1964 all Christian 
schools in the South were closed. 
Abboud's aspirations were carried out by . . mcommg governments, including 
democratically elected governments, transitional authorities and military regimes. All 
positions in these governments were held by riverin elite, who have a common ambition 
of establishing an Islamic state. For example, in 1966 Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi 
expressed his wish to introduce an Islamic constitution in the Sudan and stated this in his 
maiden speech as Prime Minister "the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one 
and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity identified 
and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival".102 This was 
followed by the drafting of the constitution in 1968 which termed Islam the official 
religion and Arabic the official language. 103 For the second time the South boycotted a 
Constitution Drafting Committee and for the second time, civilian rule failed to rule the 
Sd ' ·104 U an m umty. 
Islamism - an Islamist movement with specific religious and political ideology - did not 
begin until the birth of the Sudanese wing of al-Ikhwan al-muslimun (the Muslim 
Brotherhood) in 1949, later renamed the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and lately known as 
the National Islamic Front (NIF) or the National Congress Party (NCP). Even then the 
ICF did not function as a strong political movement until its revival in 1962 by Dr. 
Hassan al-Turabi, member of the Mahdi family. 
As a political group, the concern of the Islamist movement since the 1960s has been to 
attain an Islamic constitution which ultimately guarantees an Islamic state with specific 
political, economic and social policies. IDS The advocacy of an Islamic state with Islamic 
identity became a threat to the legal and political rights of non-Muslims. 106 Such policy 
introduced a new dimension to Sudanese politics and saw a turning-point in the conflict. 
The movement towards political Islam was taken further when Ja'afar Nimeri in 1983 
introduced a presidential decree which adopted the Sharia law as a national law. The 
101 Lesch, The Sudan, 39. 
1lI2 Quote from Wai, African-Arab Conflict, ll7. 
103 A. Lesch, The Sudan, 42. 
104 Deng, Negotiating a Hidden Agenda. 89. 
lOS O'Fahey, Islam and Ethnicity, 262-263. 
1116 Johnson, The Root Causes, 35. 
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legacy of Nimeiri's action survived into the period of al-Bashir's government and Sharia 
became a major political topic tied to the state. Islamic control became stronger when 
NIP, introduced the 'Sudan Charter' which clearly stated that 'Islamic jurisprudence shall 
be the general source of law ... '.107 
The Constitution in the Sudan 
From the time of independence, drafting an agreed upon national constitution in Sudan 
has been a political challenge. Sudan achieved independence with a temporary 
constitution which was meant to be replaced by a permanent one. Two of the main 
constitutional challenges in the country were whether Sudan should be a federal or a 
unitary state, and whether Sudan should have a secular or an Islamic constitution. \08 
Support for an Islamic constitution has existed since the establishment of the first 
constitution drafting committee in September 1956. Even though the motion was voted 
out by 21 to 8 votes, Sharia was specified as a basic source of law and Islam as the 
official religion of the country. \09 However, the Committee did not come up with a 
permanent constitution. This was repeated under the second democratic government 
(1964 - 1969) when the national committee formed to review the constitution could not 
agree on the two points and Southerners boycotted the Constitution Drafting 
Committee. I \0 
The first permanent constitution of the Sudan was only adopted in April 1973 under 
Ja'afar Nimeiri's rule. The constitution established the Sudan as a secular state while 
reinstating Sharia as the source of legislation while making provision for non-Muslims. I I I 
The Southern Province's Regional Self-Government Act of 1972, which granted the 
South regional autonomy, was also incorporated into the constitution as an organic law. 
Although the permanent constitution addressed both issues - regional autonomy for the 
South and respect of the rights of non-Muslims, its domestic structure for implementing 
the constitution was not accommodating. Political participation and political institutions 
remained limited and controlled. Freedom of speech was limited to existing political 
107 Jeppie, Sharia and State, 15. 
lOS Johnson, The Root Causes, 30. 
109 Jeppie, Sharia and State, 14-15. 
110 Abd aI-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 227. 
III National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, 1973. 
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organizations. tt2 When the constitution was abrogated in 1985, both constitutional 
questions remained unanswered. Although the transitional constitution of 1985 
guaranteed self-rule to the South, as per the 1973 constitution. it was suspended 
following the 1989 coup.1l3 
The next Constitution was only introduced nine years after the NIF seized power. Hardly 
twelve months after it was issued was it partially suspended in December 1999 by 
President al-Bashir. Under the present interim government an Interim National 
Constitution was ratified in July 2005 and a Constitution of Southern Sudan was signed 
in December the same year. Though Southern questions have been addressed, as the 
name suggests, these changes are not yet permanent. 
Conclusion 
The Sudan conflict is complex and multi-faceted. While colonialism remains the root 
cause of the conflict, there are overlapping and complementary factors which explain the 
conflict in a broader sense. First is the emergence of the Northern or riverin elite as the 
strongest entity in the Sudan. Economic, social and political status in the Sudan has for a 
long time been determined and monopolized by this small but influential group. It is 
misleading to suggest that the issues of national identity and an Afro-Arab schism are the 
root cause of the conflict. Sudan has national crises which is a consequence of 
colonialism and subsequence socio-economic and political gap between the centre and 
periphery. It is therefore wrong to generalize the conflict as one which is between the 
Northerners and Southerners. 
Contributing factors in the conflict remam the status of the South and the relation 
between religion and the state. The emergence of an Islamist movement with a strong 
ideological base of Islamization in the 1940s, the attempt, since the 1960' s to introduce 
an Islamic law (Shari'a law) as the state law governing the Sudan, and the expansion of 
political Islam has hindered the efforts made towards a nationally supported constitution. 
The duration of the conflict has also contributed to the complexity of the civil war. At the 
time of independence, the issue of power-sharing and regional autonomy was at the 
centre of the conflict. From the mid 1970' s the struggle was against Islamization and 
III Dunstan M. Wai, 'The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimiery"' African Affairs. 
78.312 (July 1979),298 
II} Lesch, The Sudan, 64. 
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since the 1980' s the struggle for natural resources, particularly oil, has played a huge 
factor in the civil war. As the conflict unfolded, concealed grievances and concerns from 
other parts of the country were brought into the arena. These areas included Nuba 
Mountains, the Southern Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur. Some of the problems are 
still ongoing and have yet to be solved. 
A final contribution to the conflict is the issue of Sudanese identity. As a Member of the 
Arab League and also due to the role of the riverin elite, Sudan is usually considered an 
Arab State. Sudan is also systematically classified as part of the Middle-East along with 
Egypt and other North African countries while its African context is usually given 
nominal significance and often acknowledged as a geographical setting and nothing 
more.
114 
\\-1 CIA: The World Fact Book [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cia.gov/ciaJpublications/factbook/print/sll.html[April 20. 2006J. 
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Chapter 2 
The First Civil war and the Addis Ababa Agreement on the 
Problem of South Sudan 
Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on some of the causes of the conflict in the Sudan. These 
included: constitutional power held by a small elite group; the socio-economic and 
political gap between the center and periphery, political and economic marginalization of 
the Southern region and the contentious issue of the relation between state and religion. 
Now that the root causes have been identified, it is important to see how these factors 
affected post independence Sudan particularly during the first civil war and the peace-
making process that followed. 
Chapter two is divided into three parts. The first part will focus on origin of the first civil 
war, and the political setting at the time. The second part will look at the steps which led 
to peace including the various factors which influenced the parties to negotiate. Lastly, 
the peace agreement will be evaluation with respect to its content and its implementation. 
The last part will also set the background to an understanding of the factors which 
contributed to the failure of the peace agreement and the resumption of conflict, widely 
known as the second civil war. 
Origins of the First Civil War 
The first Sudanese civil war (1955 and 1972) broke out in August 1955 in Torit, East 
Equatoria when Southern soldiers disobeyed orders to relocate to the North and attacked 
and killed more than 300 Northern officials and civilians. lIS Following the 1954 election, 
when the NUP took over power from the British, it rapidly extended it's authority in the 
Southern region. This included the establishment of Northerners in the South as 
administrators, senior officers in the army and police force, and as teachers and 
merchants. 1 16 These steps increased Southern fears of Northern domination. 
115 Lesch, The Sudan, 36. 
116 Johnson, The Root Causes, 27. 
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Southern fears of economic marginalization and displacement also intensified once the 
new management took over the Zan de cotton and textile scheme in Yambio district in 
Equatoria in June 1955. 117 This agricultural scheme, which employed thousands of 
Southerners, was initiated by the British once the Southern Policy was reversed as a way 
of addressing the economic imbalances between the North and the South. 118 The new 
management, established following the Sudanization process, dismissed 300 Southern 
workers for financial reasons while ignoring the repercussions this would have on the 
political situation of the country. I 19 
General dissatisfaction over the new developments was prevalent mostly in Equatoria, 
where the economic activity was concentrated and from where most Southern army and 
police personnel were recruited. 120 Tensions between Northern and Southern soldiers 
were building up in this area. These armies which were created at the time of the 
Southern Policy were stationed in their respective regions. However, NUP's decision to 
station Northern troops in the South and Southern troops in the North created unease and 
tension amongst Southern soldiers. The situation reached a peak when the Equatoria 
Corps, who were called to relocate from Torit to Juba and from Malaka to Khartoum, 
disobeyed the command and attacked Northerners. 121 The government, with the help of 
the British airlifted about 8000 Northern troops from the South and declared a state of 
p'J 
emergency. --
What was seen by the government as mutiny was understood as a nationalist uprising in 
the South, a reaction to long-term economic, social and political injustice committed 
against the people of Southern Sudan. The incident in Torit was only the beginning of a 
long civil war which claimed the lives of millions of innocent civilians. 
Southern Guerrilla Groups 
As Sudan gained independence, the conflict in the South was taking its own shape. Torit 
mutineers who crossed the border to Ethiopia began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural 
areas. This group was motivated by injustice, injury and adversity, rather than by political 
117 Lesch, The Sudan, 36. 
118 Wai, The African-Arab, 62. 
119 Ibid. 63. 
120 Johnson, The Root Causes, 28. 
12l Wai. The African-Arab, 64-65. 
122 Lesch, The Sudan, 36. 
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aWakening.123 The groups' political objective was not clear until the Anya-Nya guerrilla 
group was formed in 1963. Anya-Nya was a creation of Torit mutineers and the post-
independence politically conscious Southern Sudanese administrators and students 
affected by General Abboud's programs. 124 
During the 17 years of civil war (1955-1972) it is estimated that about half a million 
people lost their lives and an additional one million have been displaced. \2S Anya-Nya 
and its political wing - the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) were fighting for 
Southern people's right to self-determination leading to secession. This demand was not 
only grounded in the fact that the two regions were separately administered by the 
British. It was based on two premises: that the people of the south had faced long-term 
economic, social and political injustices committed by the North and that the two regions 
differed in terms of religion, language and culture. 126 
When Sudan moved towards independence, the reality of historical and cultural 
differences became more acute. The Southern Sudanese, since the early days of the 
Turko-Egyptian rule, developed a strengthening African identity. Economic dominance 
along with SUbjugation to Arab traders and slavers led to a general consensus that their 
territory had a distinctly and exclusively African entity.127 Consequently, 'South' 
emerged as a political concept and in opposition to the North which was predominantly 
identified with Islam and an Arab culture. 128 
The government's assimilation policies pursued throughout the country, including the 
South aggravated the conflict and turned it into a civil war. The effect of the war on the 
political situation has also led to a number of coups and counter-coups and popular 
uprisings that removed both civilian and military regimes in the Sudan. (Appendix 2 lists 
the different regimes Sudan witnessed in the last 50 years.) However, the change in 
government did not make a difference to the livels of the people of Sudan, particularly 
Southerners. As the violence escalated, the differences between the representatives of 
m O'ballance, Sudan, 18. 
12-1 Douglas Johnson, "The Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism", in 
Christopher Clapham ed., African Guerrillas, (Oxford: J. Currey Kampala: Fountain 
Pub. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1998),55. 
125 Assefa, World Council of Churches, 147. 
126 M.T. Ali, O. Matthews, and S.1. Spear, Ali, eta\., "Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972-1983) and 
Angola (1991-1998)" in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds), in Durable Peace: Challenges for 
Peacebuilding in Africa, (London, Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p 283. 
127 Wai, The African-Arab, 19. 
128 EI-Affendi, Discovering the South, 372. 
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government and the representatives of the Southern people became sharper. While the 
cycle of war continued the challenge of building a unified sovereign state became more 
pressmg. 
Preliminary Peace Effort 
The first peace talks were launched in 1965 by Sirr el-Khatim el-Khalifa's transitional 
civilian government (1964 - 1965) which replaced Abboud's military government. The 
Round-Table Conference of 1965 was called to "discuss the Southern question with a 
view to reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the regional interests as well as the 
national interests of the Sudan".129 The conference was marked as a historical event in a 
number of ways, but most importantly due to its achievements in bringing the North and 
South together again, after the 1 uba Conference of 1947. 
However, unlike the luba Conference, the Round-table was attended by both parties with 
more or less equal representation. Parties from the Northern region included Umma, 
NUP, SCP, ICF and NF (representing professionals) while the Southern region was 
represented by three groups: the Southern Front (SF) and the two Sudan African 
Nationalist Union (SANU) factions - Aggrey laden's group known as 'SANU Outside 
Wing' and William Deng's group, the 'SANU Inside Wing' .130 
Even though it they were encouraged to see the South with fair representation, the 
conference was a challenge for the groups with regard to reaching a consensus on the 
future of the South. When it came to listing grievances and historical discrimination and 
violence committed against the South all parties spoke with one voice. However, they 
differed with regard to the solutions they proposed for the Southern problem. The SF 
believed the problem could only be addressed through self-determination, the SANU 
Outside Wing proposed separation and SANU Inside Wing insisted on a federal 
arrangement. 131 
Differences within the Southern political groups made it impossible to reach consensus at 
the Round-table. The conference therefore adjourned with the appointment of a Twelve 
129"Resolutions of the Round-Table Conference on the South, Khartoum, March 16th _25 t\ 1965" in The 
Southem Sudan: The Prohlem of National Integration, Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Class, 
1973), p. 207-209 
13D The division within SANU was along location and vision for the future of the South. SANU outside 
spoke on behalf of those in exile and operated outside of the Sudan while SANU inside operated from 
within the Sudan. 
I31 Johnson, The Root Causes. 32-33. 
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Man Committee representing groups (from the North and the South) tasked to study and 
recommend constitutional, administrative and financial relations between the South and 
the central government. 132 When the committee reconvened, it ruled out separation and 
centralized unitary government, and instead proposed a scheme of regional autonomy 
within a united Sudan. 133 It also called for the transfer of some central powers to the 
regions, the preservation and development of Southern languages, the establishment of 
regional legislative bodies and a national development committee with regional branches, 
the adoption of a parliamentary system of government, and the selection of a technical 
committee to recommend financial arrangements for the proposed system. 134 
Two the major challenges at the Round-Table Conference were issues of trust and the 
timing of the conference. Neither side trusted the other with regard to entering an 
agreement. 135 Previous meetings and their outcomes, including the Juba Conference, the 
1952, conference in Cairo and the constitutional conference of 1955 were fresh in the 
minds of Southerners. For Southerners, compromising on the status of the Southern 
region was comparable to losing their demands. On the other hand, the government was 
also not comfortable with the South's demand for self-determination, federalism or 
separation. Rather it proposed a form of regional government with its own parliament, 
executive, public service commission, development committee and a university.136 This 
was the government's strategy to prevent the South's eventual secession. \37 
Secondly, the timing of the conference affected its outcome. As the conference was 
scheduled at a date close to the national election, the latter took attention away from the 
issues discussed. For political parties in the North the priority at the time were 
preparations for the upcoming elections. The Southern problem was of lesser concern in 
the North than it was in the South. 
The Round Table Conference was an important exercise in as far as it attempted to bring 
the parties together and clarify their positions for discussion. It was also an opportunity to 
132 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too MallY Agreements Dishonoured, 2nd ed. (London: Ithaca 
Press, 1992), 31. 
133 Donald Rothchild and Catherine Hartzell, "The Peace Process in the Sudan. 1971-1972" in Stopping the 
Killing: How Civil Wars end, Roy Licklider (ed), (New York: New York University Press, 1993),78. 
134'Report of the Twelve-Man Committee' in The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration, 
Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Class, 1973),211-217. 
135 Lesch, The Sudan), 41. 
136 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 101. 
137 O'ballance, Sudan, 31. 
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educate the public on the magnitude of the conflict. 138 However, it failed to produce for 
Sudan what Deng called "the national instrument required to build it as one nation".139 
However, even if the recommendations were not implemented at the time, they provided 
appropriate guidelines for the next peace talks - the Addis Ababa talks held in 1972. 
Political Dynamics in Post Independence Sudan 
The focus of this chapter will be the second military regIme III Sudan, under the 
leadership of Colonel Ja'afar Nimeiri. During this period the first civil war came to an 
end with the signing of a peace agreement. The peace lasted eleven years, after which the 
second civil war began. 
The military coup of May 1969 by the Free Officers under the leadership of Major Ja' afar 
Nimeiri was supported by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), and the new leaders 
supported revolutionary change in the Sudan.140 The Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC), which identified itself as secular and socialist, modelled on the Egyptian-Nasirite 
revolution, suppressed other political parties, particularly religion-based traditional 
political groups such as the Umma, NUP and ICF and their leaders.141 
The leader of the RCC, Nimeiri condemned the policies of his predecessors on a number 
of issues, including the approach to the Southern problem, the power politics between 
sectarian groups and the deteriorating economy. He introduced a policy "aimed at 
safeguarding national independence, consolidating territorial unity and enhancing social 
and economic change" .142 However, this was implemented through contradictory 
domestic and foreign policies which impacted on the country in general. 
In the 16 years Nimeiri was in power he shifted his ideological stance at least three times. 
Not only did this affect Sudan's domestic policy, it also impacted on the country's 
foreign policy. Internally, this led to the frequent reshuffling of cabinet and administering 
elites at different levels of government. Between 1969 and 1985, 115 Ministers served 
under Nimeiri's government in different capacities. 143 Even though the government's 
138 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 101. 
139 Deng, Negotiating a Hidden Agenda, 89. 
I.J() Khalid, The Govemment They Deserve, 242. 
I.JI Lesch, The Sudan, 45. 
1·\2 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 300. 
1.J3 Black Book 
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position on international affairs was related to national interest, its shift of alliance from 
the East to the West to the Arab world reflected the indecisiveness of the government. 
Nimeiri's rule can be divided into three periods: (1) the pre-1971 coup period, where he 
was ideologically attached to the concept of 'pro-Soviet socialism' and 'pro-Arab 
socialism' with strong ties to the East bloc, particularly the USSR and Eastern Europe, 
and Egypt and Libya from the Arab world; (2) post 1971 - 1977 where he shifted to a 
'pragmatic' pro-Western European orientation' 144; and (3) the post 1978 period of 
'Islamic radicalism' and reconciliation with Northern political forces. Domestic policy 
was also characterized by changing political alliances: 1969 - 1971 with the Sudan 
Communist Party (SCP), 1972 - 1977 with liberal technocrats from North and South and 
from 1978 with traditional Northern sectarian groups. 
A study of these periods is central to an understanding three important issues related to 
the first civil war. The first is the dynamics through which the parties carne to the 
negotiation table, secondly, the peace agreement itself and the nature in which it was 
implemented and thirdly, the causes of the second civil war. 
Period between 1969 - 1971: Relations with the SCP 
Accusing prevIOUS governments of mishandling national concerns and perpetuating 
division in the country, Nimeiri announced a new ideological approach which proclaimed 
socialism instead of Islarnism for the whole country.145 Through the 9 June 1969 
declaration Nimeiri pledged his determination to "arrive at a lasting solution" on the basis 
of "the right of the Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a United Sudan".146 
Nimeiri also believed that political problems were mainly due to power struggles 
amongst sectarian leaders and Muslim Brothers leading to political instability and 
deterioration in the economy.147 Nimeiri believed that the Southern problem could only 
be solved through political means and not militarily. 
The SCP also believed that 'the cause of the Southern problem was the inequality which 
existed between the North and South as a result of uneven economic, social and cultural 
144 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 297. 
1~5 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 12. 
146 Lesch, The Sudan. 46. 
1~7 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 300. 
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development. 148 Since the Round-Table Conference, the SCP had been advocating 
autonomous rule in the South, but under 'a broad socialist oriented democratic 
movement' forming part of the revolutionary structure in the North .... 149 
The SCP's ideology influenced Nimeiri's national programs and foreign policy. Between 
1969 and 1971 the government's economic policy was geared towards development 
programs, including state-led industrialization and the expansion of capital-intensive 
agricultural schemes. ISO In terms of foreign allies, Nimeiri established relations with the 
Eastern bloc - Soviet, Eastern Europe and other communist countries including China 
and Romania. 
The relationship between Nimeiri and the SCP soured around the issue of the future of 
the SCP and their respective visions on the new radical Arab coalition/union with Egypt 
and Libya. lSI Within the RCC itself, Nimeiri and his pro Arab nationalist group intended 
to create a one-party system led by the 'Sudan Socialist Union' and dissolve the SCPo 
They believed that the SCP should join the SSU, which would then be the only legitimate 
party in the Sudan. The SCP insisted on maintaining its independence and acting as a 
watchdog to the progress of the new regime. It could only fulfil this role the party 
retained its independence from the regime. IS2 Contention between the two affected the 
implementation of government policies, including those recorded in the June 
Declaration. ls3 
Nimeiri's vision included a move towards creating an Arab federation with Egypt and 
Libya. The Tripoli Charter, signed in December 1969 between Nimeiri, Nasser and 
Ghadaffi, set out the aims and principles of an Arab Federation of Egypt, Libya and the 
Sudan with envisaged cooperation on defence, foreign policy and economic matters. IS4 
The SCP saw the union with Egypt and Libya as a threat to Sudan's domestic policy.155 
Nimeiri's solution to the Southern problem was also incompatible with the creation of a 
federation with Egypt and Libya. 
148 Deng, Negotiating a Hidden Agenda, 89. 
149 John Howell, "Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict" International Affairs (Rovallnstitute 
of International Affairs), Vol. 54, No.3, July 1978,422 
ISO Lesch, The Sudan, 45. 
15lWoodward, Sudan 1898 -1989, 138-139. 
152 Tim Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politic, 1898 - 1985 (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), 250. 
153 Alier, Too Man." Agreements, 56. 
154 Niblock, Class and Power, 247. 
155 Woodward, Sudan 1898 - 1989, 139. 
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The SCP attempted an abortive coup on July 1971. Nimeiri undertook a massive purge to 
eliminate opposition elements in the military, the party and government administration 
and replaced them with Arab nationalists. ls6 Nimeiri also accused the Soviet Union, the 
principal supporter of the government, of supporting the coup attempt. Until the time of 
the attempted coup, Soviet was the principal source of Sudan's economic and military 
aid. The Soviet Union provided Sudan with over $150 million in aid after the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, and it had more than 1 000 Soviet military personnel stationed in Sudan to 
assist the Sudanese Defence Force (SDF) in the civil war with the South. ls7 After the 
coup, relations with Soviet Union halted but Nimeiri's relations with the eastern bloc did 
not come to an end. Sudan received aid and loans from Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
China. ls8 Sudan's relation with China was strengthened after the COUp.IS9 
Period between 1972 -1977: Nimeiri and the Liberal Technocrats 
Following the attempted coup, Nimeiri dissolved the RCC, assumed leadership of the 
SSU party and promulgated a new constitution which granted him an executive power as 
the President of the Republic. 16o In the presidential elections held in September 1971 
Nimeiri, the only candidate won with 98.6% of the votes. 161 This was repeated in the 
April 1977, election where Nimeiri won with 99.1 % votes. 
Nimeiri's allies now became the liberal technocrats from the North and the South. 
Members of this group were in general less politically active, and less concerned with 
transforming the nature of Sudanese society than developing it within the existing 
framework. 162 Southern Sudanese representative appeared at the centre of Sudanese 
politics for the first time once the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. 163 
The technocrats and the Arab nationalists did not make a cohesive team. The technocrats 
favoured the restoration of diplomatic relations with the US and a negotiated settlement 
156 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 69. 
157 Korwa G. Adar, "A State under Siege: The Internationalisation of the Sudanese Civil War." African 
Security Review. 7, I (1998) [Online], Available: http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASRJ7Nol/Adar.html. 
[October 23, 2005]. 
158 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics. 310-311. 
159 Ibid. 311. 
1611 O'ballance. Sudan. 66. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Niblock, Class and Power. 265. 
163 Khalid. The Govemment they Deserve, 243. 
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of the Southern conflict and opposed any move towards Sudan joining the Egypt-Libya 
federation, while the nationalists held the opposing views. 164 Increasingly, Nimeiri gave 
his support to the technocrats, leading to heightened interest in establishing relations with 
the US, pursuing a political solution to the conflict in the South and delaying the Arab 
Federation. 
In 1972 diplomatic relations with the USA were resumed, leading to strengthened 
relations with Great Britain, West Germany and Western Europe. Subsequently, Sudan 
became US' strategic ally against Soviet-backed Ethiopia. 165 Meanwhile, Cairo criticized 
Khartoum's move which Nimeiri was quick to defend as "his right to make decisions in 
the interest of his country". 166 
Ties with the US led to partnership in development schemes. Chevron, an American oil 
company, entered the Sudan during the second half of the 1970s to explore oil. The US 
government was also engaged in funding infrastructure as well as servicing Sudan's 
national debt in the 1980s. 167 Major development projects as well as rehabilitation and 
resettlement programs in the South were also financed by the US. 168 Monetary support in 
terms of aid, for development projects, loans and infrastructure rehabilitation were also 
channelled to the Sudan from the United Kingdom and West Germany. 169 
The period between 1972 and 1977 changed the future of the Sudan. Mansour Khalid 
describes it as a period which "realized the most lasting achievement of the regime in 
constitutional, economic and social fields".170 It was the period where agreement was 
reached on the war in the South, Southerners were invited to take part in the national 
government and a national constitution was promulgated for the first time in the history 
of post-independence Sudan. 
However, the government was far from reconciling with Northern groups, particularly 
sectarian political parties, including the Umma, OUP and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Between 1971 and 1977 Nimeiri survived four attempted coups carried out by Northern 
16.1 Niblock, Class and Power, 266. 
165 Johnson, The Root Causes, 57. 
166 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 306. 
167 Johnson, The Root Cause, 57. 
168 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 306. 
169 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 307-309. 
170 Khalid, The Government they Deserve, 243. 
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groups - in J ul y 1971 by SCP members, in January 1973 by a retired Brigadier from the 
North, in September 1975 by paratrooper regiment in the North and in the July 1976 
coup, led by Sadiq al-Mahid of the Umma party and backed by Libya. 
Post 1977: Period of Northern Reconciliation 
From 1969 to 1977 Nimeiri ruled with the exclusion of Northern political parties from the 
political stage. 171 His popularity and strong base came from the liberal technocrats and 
Southerners who benefited from his approach towards the Southern problem. However, 
as Northern political groups kept threatening the stability of the government, Nimeiri was 
forced to redefine his strategy. This led to a revisiting of the government's relations vis-a-
vis the North, at the expense of existing relations with the technocrats and the 
Southerners. 
To create a new basis for legitimacy Nimeiri called a reconciliation meeting in April 
1978 with Northern political parties which concluded with the signing of the National 
Reconciliation Agreement leading to the restructuring of the SSu. This was followed by 
a calculated move whereby Sadiq al-Mahid was called back from self-imposed exile and 
granted amnesty while Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the Muslim Brothers and other 3000 
political prisoners were released. 172 The cabinet reshuffle that followed brought members 
of Umma, DUP and ICF to official positions and Central Committee of the SSU.173 
Southerners saw the reconciliation process as a threat to two of the central constitutional 
developments which resulted from the Addis Ababa Agreement. These were the regional 
autonomy given to the South and the separation of state and religion, which addressed 
Southerners concern over Sudan moving towards an Islamic state. It is noteworthy that 
these two issues have been at the centre of political debate since the first parliamentary 
elections in 1954. 
As foreseen, Nimeiri's new alignment undermined these rights that were vital to the 
Southern people. The new alliance led to the shifting of the 1956 North-South 
boundaries, the emergence of regionalism - which divided the South into six provinces -
and the process of Islamization which followed a presidential decree in September 1983. 
171 Lesch, The Sudan, 52. 
172 Ibid. 
173 O'ballance, Sudan, 113. 
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By championing reforms pushed by Northern elite, including Islamic reforms, Nimeiri 
guaranteed his own political survival for some time. 174 
Steps towards a Negotiated Peace Settlement 
In the first two and a half years of coming to power, neither Nimeiri nor his Council of 
Ministers was ready for any form of dialogue with Anya-Nya or its political wing, the 
SSLM. However, the attempted coup in 1971 radically transformed the political scene in 
the Sudan. One of the technocrats appointed as the Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel 
Alier who also came from the region, initiated a dialogue with the Anya-Nya and SSLM. 
Getting Nimeiri interested in peace talks was a huge achievement for Alier. In an attempt 
to bridge the gap between the rebels and the government, without threatening the 
sovereignty of the latter, Alier presented 11 recommendations which were based on the 
9th June Declaration and the recommendations of the 1965 Round-table Conference.175 [A 
summary of the recommendations is listed in Appendix 3.] 
The first important step Alier took when approaching the SSLM was to admit the 
government's mistake in its policy and dealings towards the South in the past. 176 Such 
acknowledgement showed the SSLM the government's interest in peace. Even if 
Nimeiri's move to ally with the centre, after alienating the right then the left was purely 
political, it did help settle the Southern problem. At the time, building peace with the 
South also meant having a strong alternative political and military power base which 
indeed proved valuable in confronting an attempted coup led by al-Mahdi in 1976.177 
Pre-negotiations began in November 1971 with the World Council of Churches (WCC) 
and the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) as mediators. The SSLM called for a 
cessation of hostilities, including the establishment of new military posts in the war zone; 
the appointment of an OAU member observer team stationed in Juba; recognition of the 
SSLM as the sole and only body to represent the South in the talks; and the venue of the 
first negotiation meeting to be outside Sudan. In return Anya-Nya would order its forces 
to stop fighting.178 
174 Johnson, The Root Cause. 56. 
175 Alief. Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 65-66. 
176 Wai. The African-Arab Conflict, 150. 
177 Deng, Negotiating a Hidden Agenda, 90 - 92. 
178 Alier, Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. 54-55. 
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The government proposed negotiations within the framework of a united Sudan while 
Southern provinces would become regionally autonomous in a newly defined 
constitutional structure for the Sudan. 179 Even though this was far less than what the 
South had in mind, which was a federal structure in which it could exercise its autonomy, 
and thus it accepted the government's proposal of regional autonomy. 180 
In early February 1972 negotiation began in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the auspices of 
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and with the wee and AAee as mediators. After 
two weeks of negotiations, the parties came up with "The Addis Ababa Agreement on the 
Problem of South Sudan" signed on 27 February and ratified on 12 March 1972 as the 
Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement ended a civil war which lasted for 17 years and cost the 
lives of an estimated 500,000 people. While it was the first ever agreement which proved 
to have the mechanisms to solve the Southern problem, for the eleven years it lasted, this 
agreement was viewed with mixed feelings within the Sudanese community. For 
Southerners it brought hope for a better future while Northern traditional and secular 
groups were against the agreement. External forces, including the major powers, the 
OAU, African countries, NGO's and the UN on the other hand saw the peace agreement 
as a unique process which ended a protracted civil war. The difference in perspective 
towards the agreement, particularly within the Sudan, was obviously not a good sign for 
the sustainability of peace. 
The Dynamics of Prospective Conditions for Negotiation 
Without the parties willingness to talk there is no peace to negotiate. Dunstan Wai rightly 
raises an important question: "why did the Sudan government, after a period of bitter 
conflict in which it had invested considerable resources, change its policy and agree to 
terminate the wars on terms which throughout the period of fighting it had deemed 
unacceptableT I81 What were the factors which also made SSLM and Anya-Nya agree to 
negotiate? 
There were a number of factors that contributed to the success of the negotiation between 
the government and the Southern guerrilla group. At first glance, the role of the mediators 
179 Wai. The African-Arab Conflict, 153. 
180 Johnson, The Root Causes, 39. 
181 Dunstan, The African-Arab Conflict, 162. 
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- the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches 
(AACC) - is what is noticeable and should not be overlooked. However, there are a 
number of 'mutually reinforcing' factors which influenced the parties' decision to move 
towards peace. 
Hizkias Assefa reasons that the identity and characteristics of the participants; the 
duration of the conflict; the stalemate; interests at stake and the characteristics of the 
mediators were essential to the success of the mediation. 182 Donald Rothchild and 
Caroline Hartzell also list the emergence of identifiable bargaining parties, the leader's 
determination for a political solution, mutually hurting stalemate, external pressure and 
the active role of the mediators as the background to the success of the negotiations. 183 
Dunstan Wai's lists factors which he feels influenced the parties attitude towards peace. 
These are military stalemate on both sides, limited resources to finance the war on both 
sides, local pressure for a 9 June 1969 Declaration on the policy of regional autonomy for 
the South, Numeiri's change of allegiance, the appointment of Abel Alier and his role in 
speeding up the implementation of the policy of regional autonomy and political 
d I . h . 184 eve opment III t e regIOn,. 
These factors have indeed affected the parties' behaviour and approach towards the 
conflict. For the purpose of this paper, however, I will only deal with factors which I 
believe are significant to this particular research topic. 
Military Stalemate 
By 1971 both the government and Anya-Nya felt the political, financial and military 
stalemate. 18S Stalemate defined by Modelski and quoted by Hizkias Assefa, is the 
condition "in which neither side, given its aims, has the resources to overwhelm the other 
(absolutely, or without incurring unacceptable losses)".186 After 17 years of fighting, the 
government and Anya-Nya came to realize that one could not defeat the other in total 
victory. The central government accepted that the Anya-Nya could not be defeated 
182 Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 13-28. 
183 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 68-77. 
18,) Dunstan, The African-Arab Conflict, 162-166. 
18S Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 72. 
186 Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 17. 
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without a prolonged and expensive war and continued military repression. ls7 The Anya-
Nya and the SSLM also faced the stalemate. Through out the years, Anya-Nya grew from 
a small unorganized group to a unified army with about 10,000 - 12,000 men. ISS It had 
popular support and the armed strength to destabilize the South and worry the authorities, 
but it was not strong enough to defeat the government. 
Internal and External Political Pressure 
After the abortive coup, Nimeiri changed his domestic and foreign policy. Internally, his 
new allies were those who believed the solution to the Southern problem should come 
through political means rather than militarily. At the same time, after the SCP coup, 
Nimeiri received opposition from traditional parties as well as the left wing. Hence it was 
important for him to find a new ally who would provide solid support base to keep him in 
power. After the coup, relations with the Soviet Union, the main arms supplier to Sudan 
also deteriorated. ls9 His new allies, the Western powers, were sympathetic to his call for 
aid and loans and also supportive of a peaceful settlement of the Southern problem. 190 
The Anya-Nya was under pressure from external supporters to negotiate a settlement with 
the government. The Anya-Nya was dependent upon external support, especially for 
ammunition and medical supplies, which if cut off would curtail its activities. 191 In 1971 
Nimeiri patched relations with both Ethiopia and Uganda, who were the major supporters 
of the rebel groups in the South. Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to stop aiding secessionist 
groups in each other's countries. 192 Following the coup in Uganda, which overthrew 
Obote and placed Idi Amin in power, Nimeiri signed an agreement with the latter 
whereby Nimeiri will abandon support for Obote and Arnin in return would restrict the 
Anya-Nya's international access through Uganda. 193 
With Anya Nya's secessionist agenda lacking recognition by African countries including 
the OAU, which was keen in maintaining the boundaries inherited from colonial rule, the 
government was in a better position to receive international backing for its cause. 
187 Howell, Hom of Africa, 426. 
188 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 74. 
189 Dunstan, The African-Arab Conflict, 163. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Howell, Hom of Africa, 426. 
192 Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 159. 
193 Ibid. 160. 
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Economic Pressure 
Sudan is a state with limited resources and capacity within its boundaries. 194 Attempts to 
strengthen state control of the economy by a series of confiscations, seizures and 
nationalizations chased foreign investment and local private entrepreneurs away. At the 
same time, Sudan's instability made it difficult to attract foreign investments and funding 
from international financial institutions. 195 Even if one or both parties had the resources 
to continue the conflict, the rising costs of the conflict affected the parties. 196 
Leadership Role 
Political leadership and will is required to free a nation from conflict. While Nimeiri and 
Joseph Lagu, the leader of the SSLM and Commander-in-Chief of the Anya-Nya played 
prominent roles as leaders of the two parties, Alier as a catalyst to the whole negotiation 
played an invaluable role. Throughout the process, not only did Alier's role prevent the 
initiative from collapsing, but it won international support for both sides to the extent of 
soliciting pledges from funding agencies for humanitarian assistance for post-conflict 
. d d I 197 reconstructIon an eve opment. 
Despite mixed responses from both sides, Nimeiri and Lagu took bold decisions in 
unilaterally ratifying the Addis Ababa Agreement, and promulgating the Southern 
Provinces Regional Self-Government Act. 198 At the time, neither party was certain about 
the political support from their respective constituencies. 199 Lagu was not only ready to 
cooperate with Nimeiri, but also willing to accept Nimeiri' s non-negotiable principle of 
Sudan's unity which was less than Southerners were requesting. 2oo As Nelson Kasfir said 
with regard to the establishing peace in the country, "the decisions of Nimeiri and Lagu 
to fully commit themselves to peace and the patient efforts of Alier ... to establish 
conditions permitting those commitments were crucial.,,201 
194 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 73. 
195 Dunstan, The African-Arab Conflict, 162. 
196 Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 18. 
197 Alier, Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 54-61. 
198 Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars, 72. 
199 Kasfir, Southern Sudanese Politics, 145. 
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The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan 
The Content of the Agreement 
The two main aspects of the agreement were the division of functions and power and 
military arrangement. These issues were tackled at the level of sub-committees on 
political issues and security?02 Economic aspects of the regional government were not 
discussed as an independent topic. According to the Addis Ababa Agreement, the 
Southern Region would become a self-governing unit within the Republic of the 
Sudan.203 An 18 month interim administrative body responsible for setting up the 
administrative arrangements, regional civil service, and the Assembly was also put in 
"04 place.-
The functions and relation of the central and regional government are described in 
Chapters IV and V of the agreement. While issues like "public order, internal security, 
efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, 
economic and social fields ... " lie within the jurisdiction of the regional government, 
national defence, external affairs, currency and coinage, communications, customs and 
foreign trade, nationality and immigration, educational planning, planning for economic 
and social development and public audit are under the authority of the central 
government.20S The agreement granted political leadership and control to the SSLM in 
the Southern region. It also gave the South the power to establish its own financial 
autonomy by raising revenues from local taxation although it would receive additional 
revenues from the central government. 
The sub-committee on security discussed military arrangements, which included a 
permanent ceasefire and absorption of the Anya Nya guerrilla forces into the national 
army and other security branches. While the regional government was responsible for 
internal security in the South, the Southern Command was made to join the national army 
made up of equal number of Northern and Southern troops. However, the police and 
prison guards in the South would be entirely recruited from Anya Nya. 206 This meant that 
2112 Initial proposal was to have three sub-committees: political, economic and security. However, due to the 
size of its delegation, SSLM insisted on having only two sub-committees (political and security). 
2113 'The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan" in The Southern Sudan: The Problem 
of National Integration, D.M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Class, 1973). p 221-243 
20.j Ibid. 
lOS Chapters IV and V of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan 
l06 Lesch, The Sudan> 49. 
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out of the estimated 10,000 Anya Nya troops 6000 would be integrated into the national 
army while the remaining 4000 would join the police force or prison service or be 
integrated into civilian life?07 Full integration of Anya Nya into the national army was to 
be completed within five years. 
The agreement also guaranteed amnesty to those involved in mutiny, rebellion or sedition 
in the Southern Region since violence broke out in the South in August 1955.208 A 
commission on repatriation and resettlement of Southerners from other countries was also 
established. Although Arabic remained the official language, English was designated the 
principal language in the South and Southern schools were allowed to teach indigenous 
languages. 209 Even though the agreement addressed fundamental rights and freedoms, 
including equality of citizens, personal liberty and freedom of religion and consciousness, 
it was not explicit on the separation between state and religion. 2\o 
The agreement was incorporated into the 1973 permanent constitution. As an organic 
law, the act could only be amended by a three-quarters vote in the national assembly and 
confirmed by a two-thirds vote in a referendum of the Southern provinces211 . This was 
meant to safeguard the Act from arbitrary changes by the central government. 
Implementation 
Although the domestic and international circumstances were opportune for the success of 
the peace initiative, there were still differences between the parties, which surfaced after 
the agreement was signed. Nelson Kasfir argues that "a few scattered violent incidents 
serve as reminders that civil wars ... cannot be entirely resolved by a single dramatic 
gesture." He concludes that the Addis Ababa Agreement "provided novel but untested 
procedures for the Southern Region ... the development of the new relationship between 
the North and the South implicit in these rules has not been easy to achieve nor entirely 
successful".212 
207 O'ballance, Sudan, 88. 
208 "Protocol on Interim Arrangement of 'The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan" 
in The Southem Sudan: The Problem of National Integration, D.M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Class, 
1973),221-243. 
209 Lesch, The Sudan. 47 
21D Adar. A State under Siege. 
211 The Addis Ababa Agreement. 221-243. 
212 Kasfir, Southem Sudanese Politics, 143-144. 
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The new relationship between the North and the South was tested during the 11 years of 
the implementation of the agreement. The 'cost of compromise and concession' was 
challenged not only between the parties but also within their respective constituencies 
and oppositions on both sides. The first sign of a compromise of Southern autonomy 
began to show soon after the 18 month transition period. During the Southern Regional 
Assembly election in 1973 there were concerns over Nimeiri's intervention in the 
nomination and appointment of Abel Alier as the President to the High Executive 
Council (HEC) and as the official candidate of the SSU?13 Nimeiri's interference created 
reservations on the electoral procedures and questioned the power relation between the 
central and regional government and the independence of the Southern region. 214 
Nimeiri's intervention continued in the 1978, 1980 and 1982 elections. Alier's 
appointment looked as if it was meant to protect Nimeiri's political investment in the new 
arrangement rather than a genuine exercise of self-rule. 
With regard to the military, the integration of 6,000 Anya Nya guerrillas into the regular 
army was completed as planned in 5 years. 2lS Nevertheless, absorption of the guerrillas, 
forming a Southern Command of 12,000 - with equal forces from both sides - was the 
most delicate task. of the regime. Many remained in the bush and were not willing to 
comply with the provisions of the agreement. Even those who complied remained 
suspicious of the army and wished to remain in their own units. Among those integrated, 
many were dissatisfied with the low ranks they received and others were disappointed for 
not being absorbed into the army.216 The number of Northern troops in the South was not 
reduced to 6000?17 Southern troops were not only suspicious of the integration and 
redeployment of Northern troops in the Southern region, but also the presumed 
superiority the Northern troops had over the Anya Nya guerrilla troops. Within the 
integrated army, the Anya Nya soldiers were called 'absorbed' units, while the national 
troops were referred to as 'old' units?18 
By the mid 1970s Southerners expressed general disappointment over the level of central 
expenditure allocated to rebuild the war-devastated infrastructure in the region. 219 The 
213 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 87. 
21-l Ibid. 
215 Khalid, The Government they Deserve, 273. 
216 Johnson, The Root Causes, 41. 
217 Ibid. 42. 
218 Kasfir, Southern Sudanese Politics, 149. 
m Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 87. 
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Addis Ababa Agreement granted the Southern Region extra sources of revenue from the 
national budget. Although the reversal of the 1970 nationalization policy and signing of 
the peace agreement brought the Sudan increasing western aid, both developmental and 
humanitarian, economic mismanagement on both sides brought serious discontent in the 
. 220 
regIOn. 
Meanwhile, the almost non-existent infrastructure was burdened with the return of over 1 
million refugees. This brought a population increase of 33% more than the South had 
been coping with when the civil war ended. Its limited tax base made it dependent more 
on the subsidies from the national treasury and on external assistance.221 In the budget for 
1974-75 the regional government was expecting 88% of its revenue to come from the 
22') 
central government. -
Furthermore, Nimeiri's strategy for rapid growth of mechanized agriculture put the 
country in severe debt. The overflow of development activities - in mid and late 1970s -
with the aim of increasing gross domestic output led Sudan into a deep economic crises. 
Money borrowed with the expectation that it would be repaid out of increased production 
ended up not being paid. By 1980 Sudan's annual output declined, as did the growth rate 
of exports to negative five point seven percent. The annual balance of payments deficit 
rose from thirty point five million Sudanese pounds in 1973-74 to 310.6 million Sudanese 
pounds in 1981-82. Sudan's external debt by 1978 was standing at three billion dollars, at 
the beginning of 1982 it increased to $5.2 billion and by April 1985 it had reached $9 
billion.223 
Failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Beginning of the Second Civil 
War 
In addition to the growing economic pressure in the country, there were a number of 
issues which led to the failure of the agreement and led to the second civil war. First, 
around the mid 1970's Nimeiri' s proposal to open a joint Sudan-Egypt project to build a 
175-mile canal between Jonglei and Malakal became a major confrontation between 
Khartoum and the Southern Region, Water being the main asset of the Southern region at 
220 Wai, The Sudan: Domestic Politics, 306-309. 
221 Wai. The African-Arab Conflict, 159. 
m See Kasfir, 152-159 and Khalid, 273-275. 
m Niblock, Class and Power, 283. 
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the time. The central government argued that the canal was needed to meet planned agro-
industrial expansion in the country?24 However, Southerners feared that the drying effect 
in the swampy Sudd area would drain pastures, dry up wells, change the climate and 
generally undermine the pastoral life style.225 Despite criticism from Southerners and 
external experts, Nimeiri, with only some hesitation from the HEC, went ahead with the 
Secondly, the discovery of substantial amount of oil in Bentiu district (a border area 
between the North and the South) in 1978, Southern Kordofan and Upper Blue Nile in 
1979 , Unity oil fields in 1980, Adar oilfields in 1981 and Heglig in 1982 created a an 
interesting dimension to the situation in the Sudan.227 Nimeiri replaced Southern troops 
stationed in the Bentiu district with Northerners.228 This was followed by the drafting of a 
new bill by the Attorney General at the time - Hassan al-Turabi - to redefine the North-
South boundary. The discovery of oil led to hope amongst the South that this would 
create economic opportunities in the area and contribute to the development of the 
region229. However Nimeiri's decision in 1981 and 1982 to locate the refinery in the 
North and also build a pipeline at Port Sudan on the Red Sea created resentment and 
rebellion in the Southern region.230 As the second civil war broke out in 1983, SPLMlA 
attacked Chevron's oil operations in 1984 and forced it to abandon its USD 800 million 
investment in the area.231 
Thirdly, the government unconstitutionally divided the South into three provInces, 
namely, Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Blue Nile. This act of decentralization was 
meant to neutralize the role of Southern regional government in economic matters.232 
According to the provisions of the agreement, a referendum or endorsement by the 
regional government should precede such action. While Southerners wanted to ensure 
224 Johnson, The Root Causes, 47. 
225 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 88. 
226 Alier, Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 197-200. 
227 Shannon Lee Field, "The Internal and External Contexts of Oil Politics in Sudan: The Role of Actors" in 
Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future 
Prospect, ( Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), p. 68 
228 "God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan." International Crises Group (ICG), 
Africa Report, 38, (January 2002), 12. 
229 Rothchild and Hartzell, The Peace Process, 88. 
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their own security, the central government was obsessed with guarantees that the region 
would not secede, particularly after the discovery of oil. 
Most Southerners, including Abel Alier, were against the division and saw it as an 
intention to divide-and-rule. Alier argued that regionalism would break up the Southern 
voice and hence lead to division amongst Southern people. On the other hand, Joseph 
Lagu supported the initiative as an effort of 'decentralization for development'. However, 
the actual intention behind Lagu's support came from a sense of insecurity. Coming from 
the Nuer tribe, Lagu and most Nuer's felt marginalized by the systematic monopoly of 
power and regional institutions by the Dinka ethnic group. This will be discussed in 
chapter three. 
Fourthly, in an attempt to secure legitimacy and support from key Northern political 
groups Nimeiri introduced the Sharia law - Islamic penal, commercial and tax codes -
as a national law in September 1983. By introducing the September decree Nimeiri 
institutionalize Islam as the state religion and, as Ann Lesch quotes from Carolyn Fluehr-
Lobben and made Sharia "the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan.,,233 The 
adoption of Sharia law contradicted the Addis Ababa Agreement which guaranteed 
religious pluralism in the Sudan. 
Conclusion 
There is considerable evidence showing continuity in the Round-Table Conference of 
March 1965 and the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. The recommendations of the 
Twelve-Man Committee laid the foundation for the Addis Ababa negotiations. Nimeiri 
should therefore be commended for reaching a workable compromise and finalizing the 
peace agreement which previous governments, both military and democratic, failed to do. 
Both the Round-Table Conference and the Addis Ababa meeting were initiated by the 
government. In both occasions the personal commitment of the leadership was crucial. In 
the case of the Round-table Conference, el-Khalifa' s interest and personal commitment in 
finding a solution to the Southern problem should not be overlooked. 
m A. Lesch, The Sudan, 55. 
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Peace prevailed, even if only for eleven years (1972-1983), mainly because of the 
willingness of the parties to observe the provisions of the Accord. It also failed because 
parties went against their own commitment and violated the provisions of the agreement 
they signed. Nimeiri' s domestic policy which Ann Lesch labeled as "contradictory 
policy" is part of the reason for the success as well as failure of the agreement. 
The success of the Addis Ababa agreement was that it brought peace for the first time 
since independence and established the rules for post-war interaction and relations 
between the parties. Through the creation of a regional self government in the South, it 
developed a new North-South relation and also managed to get the government to admit 
its mistakes in relation to its policy towards the South. By creating the regional 
government in the South, Nimeiri managed to suppress the Southerner's quest for 
succeSSIOn. 
On the other hand, the agreement raised too much expectation on both sides. The 
implementation strategies outlined in the agreement did not realistically correspond to the 
timetable outlined and the economic needs of the popUlation. The sense of physical, 
economic and political insecurity felt on both sides was an impediment to peace right 
from the start. This was especially witnessed during the formation of the new joint 
national army, and in the establishment of political institutions in the Southern Region. 
Scholars have different interpretations as to why the government decided to negotiate and 
furthermore compromise. John Howell argues that Nimeiri's willingness to concede to 
Southern claims was mainly strategic. He concludes that even if the South succeeded in 
gaining regional autonomy, it was clear to Nimeiri that the South would be dependent on 
the North both economically and politically. Therefore, national unity would be enforced 
indirectly and in the long run, the status-quo would be maintained.234 
Deng, on the other hand argues that the Khartoum government had a secret plan not 
revealed during negotiations. This included using the peace agreement to ensure Southern 
rebels surrendered their arms and then within two or three years, nullifying the agreement 
and continuing with the revolutionary agenda without a military threat from the South?35 
m Howell. Hom of Africa. 425. 
235 Deng. Negotiating a Hidden Agenda, 93. 
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Both Howell and Deng's argument do not take into account the cost of the war, which 
was far greater than that of concessions that were likely to come with a peace agreement. 
Factors like the military and political stalemate, internal and external pressure for peace, 
had a significant impact on both sides, particularly the government. Negotiation was the 
only way out of the costly conflict. However, the agreement failed to address the 
fundamental factors which contributed to the problem. Political institutions in the country 
were still run by the elite; the gap between the centre and periphery still persisted, the 
relation between state and religion was unclear and the Southern question was not 
permanently resolved. The agreement was therefore weak in providing guarantees on 
constitutional issues. 
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Chapter 3 
The Second Civil War and the Background Leading to 
Negotiations 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the main factors that led to the first civil war were discussed. The 
dynamics of the internal, regional and international politics and the impact these had on 
the internal events vis-a-vis the civil war were elaborated on. The Addis Ababa 
Agreement, its negotiation, its content as well as its implementation and failure were also 
detailed. 
The central aIm of the previOus chapter was to address specific issues around the 
agreement and at the same time examine the question of peace-making within the context 
of the conflict in the Sudan. As concluded in the previous chapter there is a continuation 
between the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Round-Table Conference which preceded 
it. However, the Addis Ababa Agreement failed in tackling the fundamental problems 
which caused the civil war. 
This chapter will elaborate on the consequences of the failure of the Peace Agreement. 
This includes a discussion of the unique developments which emerged in the early 1980's 
with respect to internal, regional and international dynamics around the conflict. This 
chapter will discuss the variables which led to the next phase of the conflict and the 
peace-making process that followed. 
Origins of the Second Civil War 
The previous chapter identified four factors which caused the second civil war. These are 
the government's proposal to build the Jonglei Canal, Nimeiri's attempt to redefine the 
1956 North-South boundary, the division of the South into three provinces and the 
introduction of the Sharia law as the national or state law despite its contentious nature. 
The grievances these government actions provoked contributed to the birth of the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement! Army (SPLMI A) in 1983 in Ethiopia under the leadership 
of Dr. John Garang. 
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From the start, the SPLM identified itself as a national movement with the broad political 
objective of bringing political reform to the Sudan. It identified itself as a social 
movement for all Sudanese which did not intend to fight exclusively for Southern 
autonomy, but rather aimed to establish a 'New Sudan' that would reflect the diversity of 
the population and ensure equal access to economic and political power for all groupS?36 
According to the movement's manifesto ' ... the SPLAIM programme is based on the 
objective realities of the Sudan and provides a correct solution to the nationality and 
religious questions within the context of a united Sudan, thereby preventing the country 
from an otherwise inevitable disintegration '" The New Sudan as a concept, therefore, 
strives to establish a new cultural order in the country' .237 
Concurrent with the violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement there was strong opposition 
to government action throughout the Sudan. Dramatic expansion of rain-fed mechanized 
farming extending from Darfur to the Blue Nile, involving the alienation of land or rights 
to the use of land (of Muslims as well as non-Muslims) and the transfer of those rights to 
merchants and government officials - the Northern elite - from the central Nile Valley 
had a catastrophic impact on the population?38 Civil unrest and opposition against the 
government was growing stronger in the Muslim areas in the North. Furthermore, there 
were popular protests against price increases and the shortage of commodities including 
fuel, soap and edible oi1. 239 Protest spread to Juba and Wau in the South, Port Sudan in 
the east, Merowe and Atbara in the North and wad Medani, Kosti, Rufaa, EI Manqil and 
EI Huda in Central province.24o The army, which was also affected by the shortages, 
supported the strikes and public protest in the streets. While the civil war continued in the 
South, popular discontent grew in the North, eventually leading to the overthrow of 
Nimeiri through a bloodless coup d'etat in April 1985. 
236 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 18. 
137 Salih, The Ideology, 198. 
138 Douglas Johnson, "The Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism", in 
Christopher Clapham ed., African Guerrillas, (Oxford: J. Currey Kampala: Fountain 
Pub. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1998), 57 
239 Lesch, The Sudan, 62. 
2~() O'ballance, Sudan, 125. 
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The Third Democratic Period and the Power Struggle amongst the 
Northern Elite: 1986 -1989 
The Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by Suwar al-Dhahab (1985- 986) prepared 
the country for a parliamentary election held in May 1986 which established a coalition 
government of Umma-DUP with 39% and 24% votes respectively. The NIP, with only 
20% of the vote, was not represented in the Council of Ministers. The coalition 
government, under Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of Umma, was a marriage of convenience 
rather than a genuine political collaboration. In the three years that followed the cabinet 
was shuffled 5 times and the coalition changed between UmmaJDUP and Umma/NIP. 241 
By 1988 Umma proved to lack clear vision in its domestic decisions and coherence in its 
foreign policies. For example, during the UmmaJDUP coalition foreign policy was 
contradictory. The Foreign Minister, who was from the DUP tried to improve relations 
with Egypt, Iraq and the US while Prime Minister al-Mahdi was keen to build relations 
with Libya, Iran and the USSR. This contradiction sent mixed signals as Iran and Iraq 
were at war, Libya and Egypt at odds while the US and USSR were fighting a proxy 
242 
war. 
All three parties - the Umma, DUP and NIP supported an Islamic state but differed in 
their approach and degree to which Sudan should be Islamized. Umma was critical of the 
September law and called for a modem democratic and sound Islamic society. AI-Mahdi 
favoured 'the full citizen, human and religious rights' of all including non-Muslims.243 
The DUP, on the other hand were against any concessions that undermined a future 
Islamic state, including regional autonomy or federalism. The DUP believed that the 
September law should be retained with some revisions. The NIP, which had gained 
substantial power since 1977 strongly believed that Islam should be the official religion 
of the state, Arabic the official language and Sharia the source of all laws. NIP wasn't 
just committed to an Islamic state but to a particular interpretation of Islamic law 
241 The first two councils were a coalition between Umma and OUP. At the third council, NIF emerged in 
the government and Hassan al-Turabi was appointed as the Attorney General and Minister of Justice. At the 
fourth council OUP was no longer in the coalition, however re-emerged at the fifth council and NIF was 
not in the coalition. 
242 Lesch, The Sudan. 76. 
W Johnson, The Root Causes. 79. 
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including a political system and Islamic doctrine that included the death penalty for 
apostasy?44 NIF also supported Nimeiri's policy on the re-division of the South. 
Meanwhile, fighting continued in the South and also spread into the Blue Nile, Southern 
Kordofan (including Abyei and Nuba Mountain) and Darfur in the North. During the 
period (1985-1988) many of the victims of the conflict were civilians, including women 
and children. It became apparent that al-Mahdi's government was not able to deal with 
the critical issues which eventually removed Nimeiri from power. Neither did he attend to 
the issues that emerged thereafter, including the economic injustices, marginalization of 
popUlations and the unrest in the North. By 1988 pressure built up in the North for a 
solution to the Southern problem. AI-Mahdi could not come up with a constitutional 
solution to address the question of the September law or the Southern problem which 
continued to be the most contentious issues. 
Wake of the National Islamic Front and its Strategy of Nation Building 
Weakness in the al-Mahdi government led to another bloodless coup in June 1989, led by 
Col. Omar Hassan al-Bashir's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from the military 
and backed by Hassan al-Turabi's NIF party. The National Salvation Revolutionary, a 
joint NIFIRCC government led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir, claimed to be neither left-
wing nor right-wing, or represent any tribal or ethnic interest.245 It aimed to build a 'New 
Sudan' which would be defined by Islam, the Qur'an and Sharia. To al Bashir's 
government, Sharia applied to everyone in the North, including non-Muslims resident in 
the region, while they accepted the South's right to choose whether or not to be governed 
by it. 246 
Members of the RCC included middle rank officers who supported the NIF's desire to 
establish an Islamic state. Immediately after taking over power the NIFIRCC banned 
trade unions and political parties, suspended the constitution and declared a State of 
Emergency. By 1991 the process of establishing an Islamic legal system saw Sharia was 
embedded in the penal code. Holy war against 'apostates and heathens' began to guide 
244 Robert O. Collins, "Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the 
Sudan", African Studies Review, Vol. 42, No.2. (September 1999), pp. 107. 
245 O'ballance, Sudan, 165. 
246 Johnson, The Root Causes, 79. 
52 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
the administration of all government agencies and the military.247 This added a whole 
new dimension to the dynamics of the civil war. 
Internal political development 
The NIF openly began advocating its ideology of political Islam. AI-Turabi's strategic 
alliance with Nimeiri during the period of National Reconciliation (1977 and 1984) 
enabled it to play an influential role in paving the way for Islamists in the government. 
AI-Turabi, who at the time was appointed as the Chairman of the special committee for 
the 'return of the laws to compatibility with the Sharia' took the responsibility of 
harmonizing Sudan's legislature with the Sharia.248 This led to the adoption of the 
September Law which endorsed Sharia as a national law. This included the drafting of 7 
bills related to the prohibition of alcoholic beverages, gambling, banning of usury, Sharia 
penalties prescribed for murder, theft and adultery.249 
NIF sustained its power through senes schemes which enabled it to build a strong 
foundation in the political and economic system. This included control of foreign 
exchange, monopoly of the economy, controlling civil service and the armed forces and 
the flow of information to the population.25o In pursuit of its ultimate objective, the NIF 
devised a systematic plan to transform the civil service, armed forces and security 
structures. Once in power, the RCC, influenced by the NIF central committee dismissed 
14,000 civil servants, including 128 judges and legal advisors. Despite the heavy fighting 
in the South, it dismissed close to 1500 army officers in 1993 and replaced them with the 
so-called Popular Defence Force (PDF), militias indoctrinated by NIF ideology. 
By October 1993 the process of restructuring the political system was well underway. 
The government dissolved the RCC and announced that Sudan's government was no 
longer a military government but civilian one led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir as the 
President of the Republic?51 The The cabinet reshuffle that preceded the announcement 
consolidated the NIF's control over economic and social aspects of the country, as well 
as national security, with the appointment of NIF and ex-RCC members to key 
247 Collins, Africans, 107. 
248 Gabriel Warburg, Islam. Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya. (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2003), 155. 
249 Ibid. 155-160. 
250 "Sudan: The Islamic Front in Power", Africa Confidential, Vol. 32, No. 14, 12 July 1991 
251 "Sudan:Turabi 's unconvincing transition", Africa Confidential, Vol. 34, No. 21, 220ctober 1993 
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positions.252 The NIF Central Committee, chaired by al-Turabi, advised politicians the 
way in which NIF preferred the country be run.253 The diplomatic service and the 
judiciary were also politicized.254 
With the introduction of the Islamic banking system in the late 1970' s as part of the 
financial law of the country, NIF gained financial capital and influence out of proportion 
to its electoral support.255 By 1989 financial interests in companies under direct or 
indirect NIF control, both in Sudan and overseas, amounted to about $800,000 million?56 
NIF's supporters, mainly from the riverin areas, profited from tax exemptions on 
investments in privatized state corporations, real estate and large-scale mechanized 
agriculture for export production.257 The strong economic backing NIF supporters 
received from the Islamic bank deepened the economic divide between those in the centre 
and the rest of the population?58 
By controlling foreign exchange, the government had access to financial resources such 
as remittances sent by the Sudanese diaspora in the Middle East. Access to such 
resources made it easy for the NIF to take over currency dealing and build a strong 
capital base. NIF became not only the most organised and highly motivated political 
organisation in Sudan but also the wealthiest. 259 
Power Relations between the NIF and Northern Groups 
The first presidential and legislative elections since 1986 took place in March 1996. The 
election was boycotted by opposition parties and al-Bashir, being the only candidate won 
the presidency with a majority of over 70% of votes cast and al-Turabi was unanimously 
elected as the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.260 Two years later, in June 1998, the 
government adopted an Islamic Constitution which endorsed the supremacy of Islamic 
law as a source of legislation. A Bill of Rights was adopted and a Constitutional Court 
established. The NIF renamed itself the National Congress Party (NCP) in the same year. 
252 Lesch, The Sudan, 117. 
253 Colin Legum, African Contemporary Record, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 509. 
25-1 Collins, Africans, 107. 
255 Johnson, The Root Causes, 80. 
256 Warburg, Islam, 212. 
257 Johnson, The Root Causes, 80. 
258 Johnson, The Root Causes, 80. 
259 "Sudan: The Islamic Front in Power", Africa Confidential, Vol. 32, No. 14, 12 July 1991. 
2611 O'ballance, Sudan, 188. 
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AI-Bashir was re-elected in the 2000 election which was again boycotted by opposition 
parties. Despite transforming itself from a military government to a civilian one, it 
remained one of the most repressive regimes in Africa. 26 I With its Islamist agenda, the 
government was not only opposed in the South, but also by Northern political groups 
who were also marginalized. These included the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), 
Umma, DUP, the Communist Party, trade unions and professional associations. 262 
Although the constitution guaranteed citizens' right of association including political 
association, opposition groups at large rejected the NIF's the drafting of a constitution as 
insufficient and an act to achieve legitimacy and to improve its image as a supporter of 
democracy at home and abroad. 263 The Khartoum government continued to control civil, 
military and security structures; restrict independent associations and control education 
policy.264 Overall, the government was reluctant to make any changes that would 
jeopardize its goal. 
Intra Party Politics and Power Struggle 
Bashir versus Turabi 
Relations between the NIF and RCC was never one without conflict. When the Islamic 
legal codes were promulgated in 1991 the NIF anticipated that the Islamic state would 
replace the military regime. Two years later, al-Turabi openly challenged the RCC to 
disband in favour of a non-military government dominated by Islamists?65 Indeed in 
1993 the RCC, under pressure from al-Turabi, dissolved and the NIF became the 
strongest political force in the country. Although al-Bashir remained the Head of State, 
NIF leaders held key economic and social positions, including in the security 
apparatus.266 Disagreement between al-Bashir and al-Turabi became open conflict by the 
mid 1990s. A power struggle over the ruling National Congress (NC) led to a split, with 
al-Turabi creating the Popular Congress (PC) in July 2000 in opposition to al-Bashir. 
261 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 26. 
262 NDA was formed in 1990 to oppose NIF. The alliance consists of Southern-based Union of Sudan 
African Parties (USAP) and SPLM/A, DUP, Umma, SCP, Sudan Trade Unions Association, Independent 
National Personalities and the Ba'ath Party, Free Lions, the Legitimate Command and the Sudan Allied 
Forces and marginalized communities including Darfur's Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) which joined 
in February 2004. 
263 Warburg, Islam, 216. 
264 Lesch, The Sudan, 134-147. 
265 Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 509. 
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AI-Bashir used the old themes of Arab domination in a radical Islam guise while al-
Turabi claimed to de-Arabize Islam to the benefit of all population?67 While al Bashir 
was concerned with preserving the role of the Arabized elite in Sudan, AI-Turabi's vision 
was to mobilize a revolution throughout Africa. 268 AI-Turabi' s modem Islamist 
movement was more contemporary and different from the traditional patterns al-Bashir 
and the traditional sects promoted. It called for the adoption of more 'advanced patterns' 
in politics, economy and culture than those in socialist, communist and capitalist 
systems?69 
This difference caused a split in the movement, with al-Turabi and his followers moving 
away from the traditional focus of Nile Valley Islamism and its close association with the 
Arab world.27o In the process of expanding its grand Islamic objective, al-Turabi 
mobilized the marginalized non-Arab population in Darfur, promising that Islam could be 
a route to their enfranchisement - economic, social and political - as citizens of an 
Islamic state. 271 Despite their strong ideological, personal and tactical differences, Turabi 
signed an agreement with the SPLA whereby the two pursued the objective of 
overthrowing al-Bashir.272 In retaliation the government reacted by banning the PC and 
detained many of its leaders, including al-Turabi, who was detained in February 2001. 
Fragmented Opposition Forces 
The dissent amongst the opposition groups made it difficult for forces to unite or have a 
clear vision of how they should deal with the internal political situation. Differences 
between Umma and the DUP as well as between secularists and traditional religious 
groups had the characteristics of inter party politics.273 Furthermore, division in the South 
and weakness in the SPLMI A dimmed the prospects of bringing change in the Sudan. 
Groups opposed to NIFIRCC in the North included two major Muslim sects - Umma and 
the DUP - trade unions and the secular professional elite. In the rural areas the strongest 
267 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 26-27. 
268 Alex de Waal, "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap", London Review of Books, Vol.26 No.15, 5 (August 
2004),6. 
269 Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94),509. 
270 Alex de Waal, "Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External 
Engagement", African Affairs, 104,415 (Oxford University Press, 2005),191. 
271 de Waal, Who are the Darfurians, 191. 
272 "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crises", International Crises Group Africa Report, No. 76, 25 (March 
2004),8. 
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opposition came mainly from the Beja Congress, and the Christian population of the 
Nuba Mountains.274 While political parties continued to be prohibited in Sudan, Sudanese 
opposition groups in exile formed the NDA in May 1990 in Cairo, Egypt. Egypt's interest 
in Sudan will briefly be discussed in the next chapter. While there were long-term 
conflicting interests amongst NDA members, they were united by having the NIF as a 
common enemy and their support for a united Sudan. 
The issues of a secular constitution versus an Islamic one and the question over the right 
of the Southern population to self-determination remained unresolved. Umma and the 
Communist party claimed to have no objection to the South's right to self-determination, 
but qualified their stand by setting a timetable for when such a move would be possible. 
This obviously put their commitment in doubt.275 The DUP rejected the notion and 
looked towards the re-establishment of the relationship it forced upon the South in the 
1950s - era of 'Arabization and Islamization' . 
Beyond their commitment to overthrow the government there was no common 
understanding on a long-term and sustainable settlement of the war.276 The alliance was 
obviously one of convenience rather than one based on principle or belief. Bona Malwal, 
a prominent Southern scholar, rightly questioned SPLMlA's membership of the NDA. 
Given the history of the North " ... Southerners who in 1990 opted to work within the 
NDA, chose to set aside their doubts about the sincerity of the Northern political parties 
within the organization because they believed that these groups were prepared to 
fundamentally re-examine the relationship between North and South and to work for 
positive changes. Those hopes have since proved to be naive because once again the 
Northern parties have shown themselves to be more interested in regaining political 
power than in genuinely searching for political solutions to Sudan's problems and 
conflicts." He goes on suggesting that' ... the South needs to pull out of all the alliances 
with groups in the North" and "concentrate on securing their own unity over the 
demands for self-determination,,?77 
274 Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 510. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 25. 
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The alliances' lack of unity meant it was not able to seriously challenge the 
government. 278 Nevertheless, the NDA continued to exist and SPLMlA also continued its 
alliance with the NDA. Since the early 1990s the SPLA remained the official army of the 
NDA, supplemented by the Beja Congress from the north-east and the Sudan Allied 
Forces (SAF), composed of secular Northern politicians and intellectuals. 279 In 1990 the 
SPLM made its transmitter, based in Addis Ababa, available for NDA's use. Radio SPLA 
and the sporadic NDA broadcasts were avidly listened to in the South and the North?80 
Internal Division within the South 
Regardless of the North-South problem, hostilities within the Southern groups 
contributed to the conflict. Division within the South is not unique to the second civil 
war. The different visions and approaches in addressing the Southern question were 
clearly visible during the 1947 conference, the 1965 Round-table conference and the 
1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. However, the divisions during the second civil war were 
not restricted to verbal disagreements, but caused fighting leading to causalities amongst 
Southerners. This division was triggered by three factors: differences over separation 
versus unity, power relations in the country and ethnic conflict. 
Separation versus Unity 
The SPLM's claim to build a new united Sudan reflected the concerns that existed since 
independence. For the past 5 decades power was held by the elite at the expense of the 
majority.281 As a point of departure, the SPLM manifesto states that 'human beings in any 
society have equal rights and obligations regardless of race, beliefs, colour, etc. The 
establishment of the new Sudan cultural order demands a radical restructuring of state 
power to establish genuine democracy and to follow a path of development that will lead 
to far-reaching social change.'282 Unity, secularism and socialism were inseparable 
objectives of the SPLM/A. 283 This core ideological base earned SPLMlA strong and 
sustained support in the North as well as from its neighbour Ethiopia. 
278 Emeric Rogier. p. 25 
279 Rogier. No More Hills Ahead. 24. 
280 "Sudan: A Regional Setback for the SPLA", Africa Confidential, Vol 32. No. 12, 14 June 1991. 
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Beyond ideological interest, there were a number of reasons for the SPLM to adopt the 
policy of unity, some tactical and others based on political realities. Ideologically, if 
SPLM advocated separation, it would have contradicted the interest of Ethiopia, which at 
the time was also fighting against its own separatists.284 In a broader continental context, 
separatist movements were still not recognized by African countries and the OAU. In 
fact, the OAU, since its inception in 1963 supported the retention of territorial boundaries 
inherited at independence. Gerard Prunier further argues that Garang changed its 
movement to 'New Sudan' to win larger constituencies and broaden its power base by 
reassuring marginalized Sudanese; appeasing the Arab league. He also wished to please 
Washington, and consolidate his standing with the UN and the OAU and other 
international elements. 285 
However, it was difficult for the SPLM to keep implementing this unitary policy in the 
face of a continuous reaction in favour of secession. Many of the old Anya Nya veterans 
were not comfortable with the Addis Ababa Agreement. With the second civil war, they 
rededicated themselves to the cause of Southern separatism?86 Some saw calls for unity 
only as a political tactic, while others wanted guarantees from Northerners before 
committing fully to a united state.287 
Power Relations 
Since 1991, tension between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups led to increased violence 
resulting in the death of up to 5,000 civilians and the displacement of 200,000.288 The 
August 1991 attempted coup by top SPLMI A leaders Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol 
led to a split and the subsequent formation of the SPLA-Mainstream (Torit Group) led by 
John Garang and the SPLA-United (Nasir Group), led by Riek Machar. Machar and Akol 
accused Garang of authoritarian rule, and condemned human rights abuses by the army. 
They disagreed with Garang's ultimate objective of introducing a 'New Sudan' .289 By 
1993, factional fighting led to growing division between the Dinka and the Nuer who 
were the supporters of Garang and Machar respectively?90 Even though Machar and 
Akol fought together against Garang they fell out in February 1994 and Machar sacked 
284 Johnson, The Root Causes, 62. 
285 Prunier, Darfur, 72. 
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287 Rogier, No More Hills, 19. 
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Akol. Subsequently, Machar dissolved SPLA-United and formed the Southern Sudan 
Independent Movement/Army (SSIMIA). 
The coup revealed concerns over the political vacuum within the SPLMI A hierarchy. The 
1991 split not only weakened the movement but also prompted a renewal of the conflict. 
While Garang's group joined the NDA coalition Khartoum established relations with 
Machar.291 By 1997 six splinter groups that emerged out of the SPLMlA signed the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Government. 292 The signing of the agreement was a 
blow to Garang, as these groups in total represented more than 70% of its senior field 
commander' s. 293 Despite the split in the movement, the SPLA continued to dominate the 
movement, with popular support from the Dinka (the largest ethnic group in the South). 
Despite reconciliation efforts from within the South, intra-factional fighting continued. 
The Dinka and Nuer Peace Conference of March 1999 concluded that these conflicts 
were primarily the outcome of the political and military ambitions of individuals?94 With 
efforts from external actors, including the US government, Nigerian mediators and the 
Carter Centre, Riek joined the SPLM in December 1999 and Lam in September 2003. 
Ethnic Division 
In 1978179 a group identified as Anya Nya II began to operate from the Ethiopian border. 
This group consisted of ex-Anya Nya fighters who defected following the 
implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The main point of contention at the time 
was their dissatisfaction with the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the 
'Dinkanization' of the civilian administration and the armed forces of Southern Sudan?95 
Abel Alier, Nimeiri's chosen administrator of the South, who was from the Dinka tribe, 
was accused in this regard. 
291 Rogier, No More Hills, 23. 
292 The groups are: United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) and the South Sudan Independence 
Movement (SSIM) of Dr. Riek Machar; Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP)of Mr. Samuel Aru Bol; 
SPLM of Cdr. Karubino Kawanyn Bol; Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) of Dr. Thiopholus Ochang Lot; 
South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG) of Cdr. Kawac Makwei; SPLM - Bor group of Cdr. Arok Thon 
Arok 
293 Hassan E. EI-Talib, "Sudan Government and the Peace Process" in Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh 
and Eddy Maloka eds., Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, ( Pretoria: Africa Institute 
of South Africa, 2004), 28-30. 
J9~ 
- Warburg, Islam, 220. 
295 Taban Lo Liyong, "South-South Sudanese Dialogue" in Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy 
Maloka eds., Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, ( Pretoria: Africa Institute of South 
Africa, 2004), 144. 
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Nimeiri's re-division of the South into three regIOns (Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and 
Upper Nile) in the early 1980's was supported by the Equatorians, who feared Dinka 
domination. Joseph Lagu and the majority of Equatorian' s felt regionalism would protect 
them from domination by the Dinka ethnic group. Meanwhile the Dinka's perceived the 
re-division as an act of divide-and-rule designed by the regime to weaken the bargaining 
power of a united South.296 The conflict between Anya Nya II and SPLMlA, among other 
issues was also about leadership. 
Internationalization of the Conflict 
The oil Factor 
Until 2000 Sudan's economy was heavily dependent on the agriculture sector. Since oil 
production and export began towards the end of the 1990s, the major source of national 
income changed to oil. When the government launched the Greater Oil Project in 1997, 
major oil companies from Canada, Malaysia and China entered into partnership with the 
Sudan State Oil Company.297 The development of oilfields gave Khartoum a significant 
strategic advantage, not only against the South but also in financing the war, fresh 
revenue for domestic use as well as servicing external debt, which at the time was 
estimated at USD 20 billion. Once it pursued oil wealth, the Government also cut links 
with Islamist organizations whose financial assistance was no longer needed.298 
In 2000, Sudan produced a trade surplus of USD 440 million in contrast to the average 
annual deficit during the past decade of USD 640 million?99 The annual gross domestic 
product growth which averaged at three point six percent in the 1990s climbed to five 
point seven percent by the first half of 2001.300 By 2004 Sudan had an excess of one 
billion barrels of oil reserves and by 2005, its daily production capacity reached about 
500,000 barrels, which was worth about USD one billion per year in revenue. 
Even though the government claims that oil revenues are used in non-military spending, 
information from Khartoum frequently suggested otherwise. For instance, in 1999 Turabi 
openly admitted that the government would buy tanks with oil profits and in mid-2000 
Bashir declared that Sudan would celebrate the eleventh anniversary of the coup by 
296 Salih, The Ideology, 195. 
297 Field, The Internal, 70. 
298 Rogier, No More Hills. 27. 
299 Field, The Internal, 70. 
3(X) leG, God. Oil and Country. 103. 
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manufacturing "tanks and heavy equipment".301 As Rogier cites from the Human Rights 
Watch report of November 2003, sixty percent of USD 580 million received from oil 
revenue in 2001 was spent in weapons purchase302 with about USD one million per day 
b . 303 elllg spent on war costs. 
To protect the oil fields and defend oil operations easily, the government has 
implemented strategies to clear the land surrounding the oilfields. One of them involved 
forcefully displacing non-Arab communities surrounding the oil fields and replacing them 
with Arab communities.304 
The expansion of oil development also contributed to the internationalization of the 
Sudan conflict. It is estimated that Sudan possesses about 1% of global oil reserves?05 
It's major partners in the second half of the 1990s were Talisman of Canada, Petronas of 
Malaysia and the National Petroleum Company of China. After Chevron sold its oil 
interests in the Sudan in 1992, the US declared Sudan a country sponsoring terrorism.306 
In 1997 the US prohibited by law its citizens from doing business with the Sudanese 
government. Meanwhile, as the momentum towards oil production increased, European 
firms like Austria's OMY Aktiengesellschaft, Sweden's Lundin Oil. Quatar's Gulf 
Petroleum and Russia's Slavneft started doing business with the Sudan. Other oil service 
countries were France, UK, Italy, Netherlands and Germany. 
China has the largest proportion of development projects with the Sudanese government. 
The relation between the two countries is one of mutual understanding - where China is 
in need of securing a long-term source of oil while Sudan needs the external credit, 
investment and market for its oi1. 307 The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
is the largest oil co-operative project in the world and the largest oilfield construction 
project China has undertaken overseas.308 
With the help of China, the Government of Sudan is planning to increase its daily 
production from 50,000 barrels per day to 90,000 barrels per day. Furthermore, China 
301 Ibid. 102. 
302 Rogier, No More Hills, 27. 
303 Field, The Civil War, 8. 
304 Field, The Internal, 74. 
30S Ibid. 70. 
306 Johnson, The Root Causes, 162. 
307 Field, The Civil War, 19. 
]OS Field, The Internal, 71. 
62 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
and the Sudanese Government have initiated development and infrastructure projects 
involving construction of dams, hydroelectric power stations, textile mills and 
agricultural schemes in total worth about USD 20 Billion.309 Bilateral trade by 2005 
reached about USD 2.521 billion, an increase of thirty-one percent since 2003.310 
According to studies, China also buys between 60-70 per cent of Sudan's exports.3I1 
While Malaysia provides bridging loans to the IMF on behalf of Sudan China, as 
Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, blocks the UN from imposing sanctions 
. h S d 312 agamst t e u an. 
Regional Political Dynamics 
Instability in the Sudan directly or indirectly affects countries that share international 
boundaries with it. Gerard Prunier describes the relationship between these countries and 
the Sudan as 'an undeclared regional war' ?13 For example, Egypt is not only concerned 
about the Islamic fundamentalist groups supported by the Sudanese Government, but also 
about the Nile waters that flow through Sudan. Eritrea and Sudan share an ethnic group 
along their border and have been supporting the rebel groups in each other's countries. 
Ethiopia has had an uneasy relationship with the Sudanese government since the 1970s. 
The area between Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda is an international cattle-raiding 
area, a source of regional conflict. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) of Northern 
Uganda operates from Southern Sudan, while Central African Republic and Chad are 
havens for SPLM members from the South and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) members 
from the west. Libya is a sanctuary for Sudanese exiles.314 Of these countries, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda play a more direct and influential role in the 
North/South conflict. 
The 1989 military coup did not improve the situation in the Sudan.315 The regionalization 
of the second civil war was largely due to the Islamist government's subversion policy 
and resulted in the Sudanese crises being transformed from a national problem to a 
309 Ibid. 72. 
310 Daniel T. M. Large, "Sudan-China Relations: A Historical Perspective on 'China's Outpost in Africa', 
7th International Sudan Studies Conference, (Bergen, Norway, 6-8 April 2006), 8, CD-ROM. 
311 Large cites a study by Chris Tomlinson, "Experts: Illegal ivory trade taking off in Africa, China the 
main importer", AP, 14 March 2005. 
m Field, The Internal, 72. 
313 Rogier quotes Gerard Prunier "Sudan's Regional War" Le Monde diplomatique, February 1997. 
314 Lo Liyong, South-South, 141. 
315 Peter Anyang' Nyong, "Crises and Conflict in the Upper Nile Valley" in Conflict Resolution in Africa, 
Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (ed.), (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), 103. 
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regional and international problem.316 One of the major concerns in the region was the 
expansion of political Islam in the Sudan. In the eyes of its neighbours and Arab 
countries, as well as in the opinion of the international community the NIF government 
harbours radical Islamic groups and their leadership, including Osama bin Laden (1991-
1996) as well as AI-Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Ell), Hezbollah, Hamas, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIl), Abu Nidal, and Gamaat al Islamiyya. 317 Fellow Arab 
League members are threatened by Sudan's support for Islamists and rebel groups in their 
. . 118 
respectIve countnes.-
With the regionalization of the conflict, a relationship developed between the Sudan, the 
SPLMI A and neighbouring countries. In the 1990s countries supporting the SPLMI A 
were Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, while Egypt, Chad and Libya were allies of the 
Government of Sudan, although the relationship fluctuated from time to time. 
Eritrea and Sudan backed each other's rebel movements and opposition groups. While 
Asmara hosted and supported the NDA, Khartoum armed the Eritrean Islamic Jihad 
group. When the NDA-SPLA attacked the Eritrea-Sudan border Eritrea assisted in 
allowing fighters across its border into eastern Sudan.319 In 1994 Asmara and Khartoum 
reached diplomatic deadlock on issues around the border conflict. 
Uganda blamed Sudan for supporting the notorious Lords Resistance Army (LRA) since 
1986, which has been accused of human rights violations in the country including the 
abduction of children from Northern Uganda. Yoweri Museveni, since coming to power 
in 1986, supplied the SPLA with logistic and military support. Museveni knew Garang 
from 1967/68 when they both attended the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. 
With the change of ruler in Ethiopia in May 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) expelled the SPLMI A and closed down its headquarters in 
Addis Ababa. Along with its base, the SPLMlA lost its supply routes and radio station. 
Suddenly, 400,000 Southern Sudanese refugees were exposed to the double threat of 
starvation and Sudanese air force bombing. 32o Mengistu supported the SPLM from its 
316 Rogier, No More Hills, 30. 
m Abebe Zegeye, "Future Perspectives and Conclusion" in Korwa Adar and etal (ed), Sudan Peace 
Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 159. 
318 "Sudan:Turabi's unconvincing transition", Africa Confidential, VoL 34, No. 21, 220ctober 1993 
319319 Rogier, No More Hills, 31. 
320 "Sudan: A Regional Setback for the SPLA", Africa Confidential, Vol 32, No. 12, 14 June 1991 
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inception, and the different regimes in the Sudan were performing the same role with 
regard to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the EPRDF's core organization. 
Once the NIF began supporting factions in Ethiopia from 1992, the EPRDF embarked on 
a policy of cooperation with the NDA. The relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan 
reached its lowest point in June 1995 when NIF aided Egyptian militants who tried to 
assassinate Egyptian president Husni Mubarak during his visit to Addis Ababa to attend 
an OAU Summit. This affected Sudan's relations with both Ethiopia and Egypt. In April 
1996 the UN sanctioned Sudan for failing to extradite the terrorists. 321 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda supported the SPLA militarily and logistically. Due to its 
conflicting relations with all three countries, the Government of Sudan faced regional 
isolation during the mid 1990s. By 1995 all three countries stepped up their military 
assistance to the SPLMI A to the extent of sending forces into Sudan. In 1996, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia and Uganda received over USD 20 million worth of arms from the US on behalf 
of SPLM.322 Even Egypt, a supporter of Sudan since the colonial times, has cautiously 
switched sides in favour of the SPLA. Egypt's fluctuating support is mainly in fear of the 
spread of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Egypt was fighting its own internal war against Islamist groups. By the late 1980's Sudan 
was actively supporting various Islamic groups in Egypt whose activities were 
destabilizing Hosni Mubarak's government. Sudan only stopped supporting these groups 
when Egypt mobilized its troops along the Egyptian-Sudanese border. In June 1995 
tension between the NIF and Egypt reached a peak when Egyptian terrorists, assisted by 
Sudanese intelligence service attempted to assassin President Mubarak during his trip to 
Addis Ababa for an OAU Summit. 
Despite the tension between Egypt and Sudan, the two countries signed an integration 
agreement in January 2004. The pact, if implemented, will allow millions of Egyptians to 
move, live, work and possess property in any part of Sudan. The implementation of this 
agreement may lead to an exodus of Egyptians into South Sudan. 323 
321 O'ballance, Sudan, 188. 
322 "Sudan: Arms Against a Sea of Troubles", Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 23, 15 November 1996. 
323 John G. Nyuot Yoh, 'The Politics of Alliances Among Sudanese Stakeholders in the Post-War Sudan" 
in Korwa Adar, John Yoh and Eddie Maloka (ed.) Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, 
(Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 98. 
65 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
As a result of its dependency on the Nile Water, Egypt has been opposed to any changes 
in the status quO.324 Egypt's interest in Sudan was not necessarily the threat of Southern 
secession leading to it losing control over access to the White Nile, but the perceived 
negative impact of having an additional riparian country claiming rights over the Nile. 
Egypt has long viewed the prospects of South Sudan's secession as a security threat to 
the 1929 and 1952 agreements. It was also concerned about the consequences of South 
Sudan allying with Uganda on the use of water and the future impact this may have on 
other riparian countries' claims over the right to use the water. 
US Policy on the Sudan 
US-Sudanese relations go back as far as Nimeiri' s time and the signing of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. However, since the 1989 coup, US Policy on the Sudan has changed 
to less cordial, especially since August 1991 - the first Gulf War - when Sudan supported 
Iraq and was therefore regarded as a pariah by the US and other Western countries.325 In 
August 1993 the US listed Sudan as the i h state sponsoring international terrorism. The 
Government of Sudan accused the US of targeting Sudan because of its Islamic 
orientation, for siding with Iraq during the Gulf War and for also having friendly 
relations with Iran. 326 
By the late 1990s the US increased economic and political pressure on the Sudanese 
government to change its policies. As bulwark against Sudan's support for Islamic 
groups, the Clinton Administration began supporting Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda and 
through them the SPLM. Deteriorating relations were evidenced by the bombings of the 
American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam in 1998, where Sudan was accused of 
supporting terrorist groups suspected of instigating the bombing; and the US bombing of 
the EI-Shifa Pharmaceutical Company in August 1999, justified by claims that it was a 
chemical weapons-making facility owned by Osama Bin Laden. 
The September 11 2001 bombing of the World Trade Centre in the US, and the US global 
policy on the fight against terrorism influenced the US' policy towards Sudan under the 
32~ Francis A. Kornegay, "Regional and International Implications of the Sudanese Peace Agreement" in 
Korwa Adar, John Yoh and Eddie Maloka (ed.) Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, 
(Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 64. 
125 O'ballance, Sudan. 169. 
326 Ibid. 179. 
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Bush Administration. Furthermore, pressure from key constituencies in the US - human 
rights activists, Christian activists, the African-American anti-slavery lobby, the oil lobby 
groups, the Congressional Black Caucus -kept Sudan high on the US foreign policy 
agenda.327 
In 2001, three days before the September 11 incident, President Bush appointed Senator 
John Danforth as his Special envoy to the Sudan. As a member of the lOAD Partnership 
Forum (IPF) established to guide the lOAD Peace Initiative, the US along with the UK 
and Norway, played an active role in the lOAD Peace process leading to the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Although the process was initiated in 
1993 it only made substantial progress once the US and other IPF members got actively 
involved in the process. 
Conclusion 
The second civil war was about the conflicting visions of the NIF and SPLM relating to 
the New Sudan. NIF's thinking was based on political Islam and its vision was to build a 
new Sudan defined by Islam and the Sharia, as interpreted by the NIF. The SPLM on the 
other hand introduced a secularist opposition and wanted to build a state that embraced 
the diversity of the Sudanese society and advocated respect for the ethnic, religious and 
cultural differences of the population. Hence the concept of 'Sudaness' was contested by 
these groups. For the NIF 'Sudaness' was linked to 'Arabic' and 'Islamic' political 
identity, while SPLM identified 'Sudaness' with cultural diversity. 
The North of Sudan was more united under Islam, while in the South, tribal and ethnic 
bonds were more important than identification with being a Southerner. As Prof. Y. F. 
Hasan has concluded, "the great achievement of Islam and the Arabic culture in Northern 
Sudan has been the creating of a feeling of cohesion among the heterogeneous 
inhabitants".328 In the South, communities were fragmented along religious, racial, 
language and cultural lines. This was evident in the early 1990s when the SPLM faced 
internal division, leading to a split into factions. The Southern groups were united only by 
327 'The Sudan - IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward", African Security Analysis 
Program, Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at 
http://www.issafrica.om/pubs/papers/g6/Paper86.htIl1 [accessed on 20 October 2005). 
328 R. K. Badal, 'The Rise and Fall of Separatism in South Sudan", African Affair. Vol. 75. No. 301, 
(October 1976).465. 
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having the North as a common enemy and even that was easily manipulated and used by 
the government for their strategy of divide-and-rule. 
In a country where thirty percent of the population are non-Muslim and almost seventy 
percent are 'non-Arabs' it is difficult to build a nation based on religious solidarity, as the 
Northern elite sought to do since independence. One of the reasons behind such 
consistent policy of Islamizing the South is the sectarian nature of Northern political 
parties - from the Umma to the DUP to the NIF and later the NCP. 
The ideology of Islamisim which spread during the second civil war also led to 
systematic marginalization of non-Muslims and non-Arabs in the North. Hence the 
gradually spread of the conflict into the North - southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Nuba 
Mountain - to eastern and western Sudan. The civil war therefore was no longer about 
the South and its demand for secession but a broader Sudanese issue. 
The discovery of oil along the North-South border brought another dimension to the 
conflict. The control of national oil reserves became a prominent concern among the 
political players. Not only did the government's policy towards oil exploration fuel the 
conflict, it also introduced a international dimension to the conflict, with external actors 
becoming interested in Sudan and supporting parties in the conflict. 
The change in the global environment was also a factor in the second civil war. The 
NCP's ideology of political Islam became a threat to regional and international security. 
In a regional context, the NCP government had diplomatic confrontation with Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. The US and its war on terror placed Sudan in the 
international spotlight. These development saw the conflict in Sudan change from being 
an internal conflict to one with a regional dimension with countries like the US and China 
having an interest in the outcome. 
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Chapter 4 
IGAD Peace Talks leading to the Signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
Introduction 
The background to the second civil war was discussed in chapter three. This chapter will 
focus on the different peace talks in the country, leading to the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The political dynamics, the nature and ideology 
of the parties and the regional and international dimension to the conflict are all factors 
which make the second civil war different from the first civil war. In addition, as the war 
continued, the factors affecting the conflict also changed. 
The peace-making process required the involvement of external actors to get the parties 
to come to the negotiation table. This chapter will examine the dynamics that led to the 
signing of the CPA, the factors that pushed the parties to reach a negotiated peace 
settlement. This chapter will also explore the content of the CPA in relation to the 
original causes of the civil war. The CPA has brought peace in the Sudan, but has it really 
addressed the fundamental concerns of the people of the Sudan? 
Peace Talks and Initiatives 
Internal Initiative 
The Sudanese civil war has seen an abundance of negotiations for peace, which the ICG 
called 'the traffic-jam of peace initiatives' ?29 Efforts to end the second civil war began as 
early as March 1986. The Koka Dam Conference organized by a group of professionals 
and trade unions and attended by the SPLM, Umma, and various secular and regional 
parties saw the formation of an alliance of fourteen political parties who pledged to work 
out a formula to end the conflict and build a politically stable society.330 The final 
declaration adopted called for a constitutional convention 'to discuss the Basic Problems 
of Sudan and not the so-called problem of Southern Sudan,.331 The meeting also agreed 
to revoke the September law and reinstate the 1956 constitution as an interim constitution 
329 leG, Oil. God and Countrv, 153. 
330 Nyong. Crises and Confli~t, 105-106. 
331 Suggested topics for discussion at the convention included the questions of nationality, religion, culture, 
basic human rights, the system of the rule of law, development and uneven development, natural resources 
and security arrangements. 
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with an amendment to incorporate regional government as adopted in the Addis Ababa 
Agreement.332 Despite the positive efforts of the Koka Dam Declaration, the agreements 
lacked government and DUP input, and were therefore not likely to end the conflict. 
John Garang and Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani of the DUP signed the DUP-SPLM 
Accord in November 1988. The DUP constrained by the Umma-NIF alliance, held series 
of talks with SPLM between 1987 and 1988 that resulted in the DUP-SPLM Accord. The 
Accord confirmed the need to end military pacts that limited national sovereignty and to 
host a constitutional conference.333 As the SPLM declared a ceasefire, the national 
military issued al-Mahdi with and ultimatum insisting that he take serious measures to 
make peace.334 AI-Mahid was forced to form a new coalition with the DUP, while the 
NIF refused to accept the terms and left the coalition. The new Council of Ministers 
proceeded with legal procedures to cancel defence agreements with Egypt. However, 
before parliament could annul the September law, and shortly before al-Mahdi was 
scheduled to meet Garang, the RCC staged a pre-emptive COUp.335 
In 1991, two major developments impacted on the conflict in the Sudan. Mengistu's fall 
led to EPRDFIRCC negotiations, which placed Khartoum in a much better position than 
the SPLM who lost their support base and primary military and logistic supplier. 
Secondly, the split in the SPLM between the Troit faction and Nasir faction weakened the 
movement. Internal division not only diminished the SPLMlA's strength and unity, it 
allowed Khartoum to play them against each other, which lead to inter-factional fighting. 
The Troit and Nasir faction were only the beginning of the further split of the SPLM into 
six factions. While these developments severely affected Garang's movement, Khartoum 
won military victories, as well as gaining political strength by striking deals with the 
different SPLM factions in Frankfurt in 1992, Nairobi in 1993 and Khartoum in 1996 and 
1997. 
Despite the fact that the 1989 coup put an end to internal peace-making efforts, it opened 
the way for external involvement throughout the 1990s. Peace attempts were facilitated 
by President Jimmy Carter (1989, 1995 and 1997) and President Ibrahim Babangida 
(Abuja I and Abuja II in 1992 and 1993 respectively) The IGAD Regional Initiative 
332 Johnson, The Root Causes, 72. 
3.13 Lesch, The Sudan, \05. 
33-1 Johnson, The Root Causes, 84. 
m Johnson, The Root Causes, 84-85. 
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(between 1993-94 and 1997) and the Egypt-Libya Initiative (ELI) of 1999-2001 also 
attempted to end the conflict. These multiple initiatives have contributed to the eventual 
comprehensive peace settlement. 
Ahuja I and II 
The Abuja talks laid down essential principles relating to the establishment of peace that 
assisted in shaping future peace talks. At the beginning of the talks, the SPLM was 
represented by the two factions (Troit and Nasir supporters) and this weakened the 
rebels' negotiating position. In the meantime it allowed the government to gain the upper 
hand during the talks and take a firm stance on the issue of the Sharia law and the 
continuation of Islam as the state religion, as well as the use of Arabic as the official 
language of the country.336 These issues, in addition to the question of self-determination 
were the stumbling blocks to the Abuja peace process. The SPLMI A demanded a 
confederation, while the government reiterated its determination to exercise Sharia 
law.337 Hence, Abuja failed to break-through the constitutional questions to establish 
peace. 
The achievements of the Abuja talks, however, where that they committed the parties to 
work towards an interim arrangement, ensure decentralization of power and equitable 
sharing of national wealth.338 The talk established an environment in which the parties 
agreed to continue negotiating on issues like the continuation of ceasefire, the issue of 
state and religion, commitment to the unity of Sudan, defining the relationship between 
the centre and state powers, the establishment of a ceasefire commission, the 
establishment of a National Revenue Allocation Commission, the adoption of security 
measures in the South during the interim stage and the status of the judiciary.339 There 
were also suggestions of a constitutional conference.34o Most of all, the Abuja talks 
succeeded in merging the two SPLMI A factions into a single delegation and focusing 
them on a common goa1. 341 
336 Rogier, No More Hills, 38. 
337 Francis Deng and Mohamed I Khalil, Sudan's Civil War: The Peace Process Before and Since 
Machakos, (Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004),4. 
338 Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and 
Future Prospects. (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 27. 
339339 Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and 
Future Prospects. (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 27-28. 
34() Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-1994), 517. 
341 Rogier, No More Hills, 38. 
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IGAD Initiatives 
Once Abuja failed, m June 1993, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD, the predecessor of today's IGAD), a sub-regional organization 
founded by Djibouti, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, launched 
a peace initiative in September 1993. In pursuit of regional security, peace and stability 
and within the framework of regional cooperation, the IGAD frontline states, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda led the initiative with a clear interest in containing the civil 
war in the Sudan as well as stopping the spread of Islamists, which Khartoum had began 
exporting to its neighbours since 1992. 
IGAD's peace-making initiative also fitted well with the post-cold war dynamics of 
building regional and international security through encouraging regionalism and 
regional organizations.342 This mechanism was also supported by the UN and major 
donor countries. IGAD's role in this regard was further strengthened with the 
establishment of the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF) , a partnership between IGAD and 
major western donors, including the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway 
and the Netherlands. 
IGAD established a Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan and initiated dialogue 
between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/ A in March 1994. Mindful of previous 
peace talks in Addis Ababa in August 1989, Nairobi in December 1989, Frankfurt in 
January 1992, Abuja I in May/July 1992, Abuja II in AprillMay 1993 and Nairobi in May 
1993, IGAD introduced a draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) to the parties. The 
frontline states, with the interest of countering the NIP's policy in the region, circulated 
their own proposal for peace rather than helping the parties work out the terms of their 
. 343 
compromIse. 
The Declaration of Principles centred on two mam Issues, namely the right to self-
determination for the South and other disadvantaged areas, and a transitional period 
within which permanent arrangements were to be finalised. 344 Picking up from the Abuja 
talks, the DOP also outlined an interim system of governance, sharing of wealth and 
resources and security arrangements as concerns to be addressed during negotiations. 
342 Abdelwahab EI-Affendi, 'The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits for Regional 
Peacemaking?", African Affairs, Vol. 100, (2001),583. 
343 Rogier, No More Hills, 40. 
344 Adar, A State under Sie[?e. 
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While gIvmg unity a priority, the DOP presented the South with the right to self-
determination. Maintaining unity was conditional on the principles of establishing the 
political, legal, economic and social framework of the Country.345 This included the full 
recognition and accommodation of diversity, political and social equality for all, the 
establishment of a secular and democratic state and the appropriate and fair sharing of 
wealth. 
While SPLMlA accepted the draft DOP, the Government rejected the notion of 
separating state from religion as well as the principle of self determination. Khartoum 
informed IGAD that Sudan's unity was non-negotiable and secularism unacceptable.346 
The deadlock worsened with the deteriorating bilateral relations between Sudan and the 
frontline states, starting with the border tension with Eritrea in 1994 followed by 
diplomatic tension with Uganda and Ethiopia in 1995. The IGAD talks which began as an 
effort to end the civil war shifted the situation to all-out confrontation, with Khartoum 
rejecting the DOP and continuing to destabilize its neighbours.347 
Despite its failure, the IGAD peace-making effort gained strong political and material 
support through the IPF. Furthermore, IGAD solicited official recognition from the IPF 
members and the UN as the sole initiative in the Sudan peace process. 
Between and After the [GAD Talks 
Once the IGAD talks stalled, SPLM strengthened ties with NDA partners while the 
Government struck a deal with Southern factions. Through the opposition conference 
organized in June 1995 in Asmara, the SPLM established relations with NDA members, 
including the DUP, Umma and the Communist Party. The Asmara Declaration proposed 
Sudan as a pluralist country where religion would be separate from the state; it suggested 
a referendum on secession be held in the South and that the political system should be 
based on democracy and religious pluralism.348 In this way it addressed the elitist centred 
political structures. The declaration recorded the sectarian parties' approval of the 
Declaration of Principles put forward by IGAD.349 
345 "Declaration of Principles", IGAD(D). Peace Initiative, 20 July 1994, Nairobi, Kenya, 
http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_kontliktlpeacepros/igad/igad_dop.html(accessed 28 April 2006) 
346EI-Affendi, The Impasse,586. 
347 Lesch, The Sudan, 185. 
348 Ibid. 194-97. 
349 Rogier, No More Hills, 25. 
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The government signed the Peace Charter and the Khartoum Peace Agreements with 
SPLM factions in 1996 and 1997 respectively. The documents signed declared the unity 
of the Sudan and at the same time provided for a referendum for Southerners 'to express 
their aspirations, by allowing them to retain the right of special legislation with regards to 
the implementation of Sharia law' .350 The Khartoum agreement included self-
determination for the South, the suspension of Sharia and amnesty for members of the six 
SPLM factions. 
At this stage, it is important to note that some of the contents of the Peace Charter and the 
Khartoum Peace Agreements were more or less similar to the issues the on which 
government had repeatedly refused to make concessions. Ironically, given the content of 
these two agreements, the SPLM rejected the documents while African countries 
supported it. In the eyes of external actors, these agreements appeared to guarantee 
religious freedom and non-discrimination and allowed special status to the South during 
an interim-period leading to self-determination.35l What the agreements lacked was the 
presence of the Torit faction of the SPLM. 
In the regIOn, Sudan's relations with its neighbours were deteriorating. The military 
involvement of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda in the Sudanese conflict took the conflict to 
another level. All three countries increased their military assistance to SPLMI A, in line 
with the US increase in military support, to a point of sending forces into the Sudan. 
SPLMlA's victories in the field, alone with internal political and ideological division 
within the NCP (Bashir versus Turabi) and regional isolation gave the Government no 
other option but to return to negotiations and accept the DOP as it was. 
However, the peace process was curtailed once Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war against 
each other in 1998 and Uganda shifted its attention to the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). As the talks continued Government of Sudan, negotiating 
under pressure, returned to business as usual. An impasse was reached central issues like 
the duration of the interim period, institutional arrangements, the areas where the 
referendum should be held and the separation of state and religion. 352 Even though IGAD 
continued the talks until October 2000 the lack of a regional coalition destroyed the 
prospects for peace. 
350 O'ballance, Sudan. 189. 
351 EI-Affendi, The Impasse. 588. 
352 Rogier. No More Hills. 42. 
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Egypt-Libya Initiative 
Once the IGAD peace process reached a stalemate, Egypt and Libya, both driven by 
national interest, initiated the Egypt-Libya Initiative (ELI) in 1999. Since the 1970s 
Sudan, Egypt and Libya had ambitions to form a broader Arab coalition in the region. 
Even if the ambitious plan did not go beyond paper, the latter two continued to want 
Sudan to remain within the Arab fold. 353 
While Egypt's interest in Sudan is in protecting the status quo of the Nile water 
agreements, the Egyptian government was concerned about the spread of Islamist 
ideology, which Sudan was promoting in the region. Therefore, Egypt's opposition to 
restructuring Sudan does not reflect support for the government in Khartoum, but comes 
rather from national interest. 
The ELI initiative was seen as a reflection of an Arab view on the peace process.354 Egypt 
and Libya were concerned about the lack of Northern opposition participating in the 
IGAD talks. 355 Both countries promoted their own interests which were linked to the 
prevention of a democratic system, which would end the NIF's power. 356 Their goal in 
general was to reconcile the North and somehow draw some of the Northern opposition 
members into the NIF.357 
The ELI initiative did not address the central issues - the question of self-determination 
for the South and the relationship between state and religion. It therefore lacked support 
from the SPLMI A and Southerners in general while Khartoum endorsed it. The SPLM 
also sought to see the initiative linked to the IGAD process, which it saw as the first 
peace initiative to correctly diagnose the causes of the war. 358 ELI was also accepted by 
the NDA leadership, despite the SPLMlA's reservations.359 
m Johnson, The Root Causes. 176. 
354 See Emeric Rogier, No More Hills, 42-43. 
m "The Sudan - IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward", African Security Analysis 
Program, Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at 
http://www.issafrica.onr/pubs/papers/R6fPaper86.htm [accessed 20 October 2005) . 
. 156 "Sudan: Delusions of Peace", Africa Confidential, Vo. 42, No. 16, \0 (August 2001). 
357 leG, God, Oil and Country, 160. 
358 Ibid. . 
359 Johnson, The Root Causes, 176. 
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In reply to the Egypt-Libya initiative al-Bashir - once his coalition with al-Turabi 
collapsed - 'did a Nimeiri' as Johnson described it and called for Northern reconciliation 
in 2000.360 He recalled both Nimeiri and al-Mahdi from exile. Once al-Mahdi returned to 
Sudan from exile, Bashir invited al-Mirghani to join in the negotiations of his 
government with NDA leaders. However, AI-Mahdi's return to Khartoum divided the 
NDA. 
Revival of the IGAD Talks 
By late 2001, ELI was nowhere close to bringing the parties to an agreement. The failure 
of ELI led to a broader appreciation and acknowledgement of what the IGAD talks had 
accomplished in introducing a DOP that addressed fundamental questions like the issue 
of self-determination and the relation between state and religion. IGAD negotiations also 
established a workable relationship with the belligerents and exhibited an institutional 
focus and international legitimacy.361 Nevertheless, it became apparent that the IGAD 
process would not reach anywhere without external strengthening which could only come 
through international pressure. 
The US' continued to show strong interest in the Sudan following its war on terror after 
September 11. Furthermore, as Sudan increased its oil production and its potential for 
contributing to the international oil industry was evident, international interest in Sudan's 
internal politics increased. These factors led to further international commitment to revive 
and reinstate the IGAD peace talks. 
Internally, once al-Bashir and Garang realized that they had failed to win the war and that 
only a political solution was possible to settle the conflict, they looked to IGAD's DOP to 
end the stalemate. It was in this climate that the IGAD talks were taken further, leading to 
the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002, followed by the Agreements on Security 
Arrangements During the Interim Period in September 2003, and an agreement on 
Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period in January 2004. An 
agreement on Power Sharing followed in May 2004, the Resolution of Conflict in 
360 Johnson, The Root Causes, 141. 
361 The Sudan - IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward, African Security Analysis Program, 
Occasional Paper 86. (March 2004) available at http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/papers/86/Paper86.htl11 
[accessed 20 October 2005]. 
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Southern KordofanlNuba Mountains and Blue Nile States III May 2004, and the 
Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area in May 2004. 
In December 2004, the Government of Sudan and the SPLMI A signed the last protocols 
on the Permanent Ceasefire Arrangement and the Agreement on the Modalities of 
Implementation for the Agreements/Protocols - in 2002 and 2004. Finally the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) containing the the rest of the 
agreements/protocols, was signed in January 2005. By signing these agreements and 
protocols parties committed themselves to a new start. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its Content 
The Machakos Protocol is the foundation for the rest of the protocols, including the CPA. 
The protocol reaffirmed unity as a priority, while granting the South the right to self-
determination through a referendum on secession, which will be held after an interim 
period of six years. It also dealt with core issues such as the transition period, state and 
religion and the structures of government. The principles and procedures to guide the 
transition/interim period of six years were also set out and the structure of the transitional 
government lay down.362 
The issue of separating religion from state was the most difficult to deal with. Islamic 
doctrine, which the NCP was committed to as a pillar for building Sudanese society, had 
been rejected by both the SPLMI A and other liberation movements before it. It was a 
major breakthrough to get the Government of Sudan to accept the principles of freedom 
of worship, non-discrimination on the basis of religion, observance of religious public 
holidays and observance of religious laws confined to the personal or family realm. 
While the text respects the exercise of Sharia law in the North it guarantees the South the 
. h . I 363 ng t to exercIse a secu ar system. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides for the formulation of a new constitution, 
and power-sharing through a federal system with a government of national unity in 
Khartoum. The SPLMI A would be represented in the new cabinet and also establish a 
separate administration for the South. General elections will be held in the third year of 
the six-year transition period. This was purposely done to allow the state to create the 
361 "Machakos Protocol Protocol" Machakos, Kenya, 20 July 2002. 
363 Ibid. 
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conditions in which Southerners could be persuaded to voluntarily remain part of a united 
Sudan.364 
The North and South were to have their own autonomous regional governments, and the 
SPLMlA would have to share, not only the civil administration, but also the security 
forces with the government in both regions.365 According to the Protocol on Power-
sharing, the Government of National Unity (GNU) comprised of the National Congress 
Party (NCP), the SPLM and other opposition groups from the North and South will be 
established. The seats of the National Executive would be allocated according to a quota 
system where the NCP gets fifty-two percent representation, the SPLMI A twenty-eight 
percent, other Northern political forces fourteen percent and Southern political forces six 
percent. This also applies to representation in the National Assembly. 
A fifty-fifty wealth-sharing arrangement - a mechanism for equitable distribution of 
revenues - was presented in the agreement. Ownership of land and national resources, 
management and utilization of oil revenues and non-oil revenues, fiscal and financial 
allocation, access and utilization of reconstruction and development funding as well as 
financing for the transition are addressed in the Protocol. The formula for sharing oil 
resources is based on a fifty-fifty split of oil exploited in the South between the National 
Government and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). Two percent of revenue 
would go to oil producing states in proportion to their output. The National Petroleum 
Commission (NPC) created in October 2005, would formulate policies with regard to the 
management and development of the oil sector, and negotiate and approve contracts for 
exploration. 
A dual banking system, with two separate currencies and two separate systems would 
operate during the interim period. Southern Sudan will apply a conventional banking 
system while an Islamic banking system will function in rest of the country. A new 
currency will also be issued.366 Civil and religious liberties and representation in the 
national government and the parliament were also guaranteed. 
36-1 Douglas Johnson, "Comprehensive Sudan peace agreement: Playing for Time", A Parliamentary Brief. 
(2005), available at 
http://www .ecosonline.orgibackipdLreportsI2005/nieuwsiFebruariI20050200CP AJ ohnson. doc [accessed 8 
October 2005). 
365 Ibid. 
366 Rogier, No More Hills. 132. 
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The Security Arrangement is one of the most complex but crucial component of the CPA. 
The Protocol on the Security Arrangement signed in September 2003 and the Permanent 
Ceasefire Agreement concluded December 2004 will preside over the security structure 
during the interim period. According to the arrangement, the two armies will remain 
separate but considered as Sudan's National Armed Forces and will be deployed along 
the 1956 North/South border. The details of the CPA make it clear that the armies will be 
disengaged, separated, encamped and redeployed. In addition, a Joint/Integrated Unit of 
39,000 soldiers - composed of the SAF and SPLA - will be established and deployed in 
Southern Sudan (24,000 soldiers), the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile (6,000 
soldiers each) and Khartoum (3,000 soldiers)?67 With the assistance of the international 
community, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants will 
take place from all sides, including the militias. 
The CPA also laid out provisions for three of the disputed areas: Abyei, Southern 
Kordofan (Nuba Mountain) and Blue Nile. In reference to the 1956 border, these areas 
fell under the jurisdiction of the Northern administration. However, due to the systematic 
marginalization and discrimination, the people of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue 
Nile states, joined the SPLM struggle from the mid 1980s.368 The provisions for the area 
state that the people of Abyei would have a referendum simultaneously with the people of 
the South and vote either to remain in the North or become part of the South. 
Challenges in Implementing the CPA 
The CPA resulted from a bilateral process which focused on the SPLMI A representing 
the South and the NCP, representing the Government of Sudan, representing the entire 
North (including the east, west, centre and north). This view sidelined other groups such 
as the NDA and the Umma Party, the PC, DUP, NDA, the Communist Party, civil society 
groups, trade unions and professional organizations. Despite their repeated request for 
observer status it was not until the final stages of negotiations that the participants and 
observers (lGAD and the observer states, namely the US, UK, Italy and Norway, and the 
UN and AU) became aware that the support of the Sudanese public was crucial to the 
success of peace-making.369 Even when the parties eventually decided to bring on board 
367 Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period between the Government of Sudan 
(GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Naivasha, Kenya, 25 September 2003. 
368 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 113. 
369 The Sudan - IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward, African Security Analysis Program, 
Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at http://www.issafrica.Ofe/pubs/papers/86/Papcr86.htm 
[accessed 20 October 2005]. 
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non-governmental groups and leading opposition parties, they did not accept the direct 
participation of these groups in the peace process. 370 
The IGAD initiative deliberately focused on the North-South dimension of the conflict 
and ignored the rest of the Sudan. The CPA therefore lacked nationwide consultation that 
would have made it genuinely comprehensive.371 As the Human Rights Watch report on 
the process states, "CPA's exclusion of other parties, most prominently the southern-
based political parties and southern ethnic militias backed by Khartoum, the Darfur 
rebels, the eastern Beja Congress ... , as well as the multiplicity of other political parties 
at home and in exile, made it much less than its "comprehensive" title promised".372 The 
word comprehensive in the CPA should therefore be understood within the context of the 
North-South conflict and not confused with the unrest in the rest of the country, including 
Darfur in the west and the struggle of the Beja people in the east even if it has been 
presented as a model for other future peace initiative. 
The CPA was meant to address the core concerns which triggered the 'North-South' 
conflict in 1955. These are political dominance by the Northern elite, the socio-economic 
and political gap between the centre and periphery, the constitutional question over the 
relation between state and religion, and the status of the Southern region. The agreement 
is therefore designed to tackle these concerns and at the same time guarantee positive 
change in the Sudan. 
In attempting to deal with the fundamental causes of the conflict, the CPA handed the 
North to the NIF and the South to the SPLM. Its strategy for peace focused on three 
critical areas: power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements. These would be 
tackled through the structures put in place including the more than 50 national bodies and 
commissions. However, the arrangements for peace resulted in the elite from the North 
and the South once again dominating political platforms in their respective regions. 
The CPA provisions for an interim period of six years, an interim constitution (adopted in 
July 2005) and the establishment of a National Government of Coalition with 
proportional representation and its provision for fifty-fifty wealth-sharing makes it 
371J Ibid. 
371 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead, 106. 
m "The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on 
Southern Sudan", Human Rights Watch, No. I, (March 2006),5. 
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different from the Addis Ababa Agreement. However these provisions lose their force if 
they are not participatory and include marginalized groups throughout the country. The 
dominant role of the NCP and the SPLM does not seem encouraging. Nevertheless, 
parties committed to respect the agreement and implement it in accordance with the 
prescribed modalities. 
The SPLM has begun transforming itself from a rebel movement to a government, a 
political party and a professional army.373 The SPLM is not only faced with the 
challenges of setting up a workable system but also with enormous expectations from the 
general population - both in the North and South. In the South, expectations are related 
to "peace dividends" promising a better life for the population through service delivery, 
in the form of health care, education and infrastructure.374 The expectations of the rest of 
the population, including those in the Centre, North and SPLM constituencies, in the 
Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile, are related to a vision of "A New Sudan" 
that the SPLM aimed for during the 21 year civil war. There is fear that war could resume 
if people feel they are not directly benefiting from peace. An immediate example at the 
moment is the conflict in Darfur and in the East. 
The bulk of the agreement was directly negotiated between the then first Vice-President, 
Ali Osman Taha and the SPLM Chairman, Dr. John Garang, aided by a small group of 
trusted supporters. The success of this approach was dependent on the personal 
relationship between the two and their joint commitment to finding a way to implement 
the agreement. Garang's death in a helicopter accident in July 2005 removed a key figure 
in the peace process.375 
In the 18 months of the implementation of the CPA, there have been signs of discontent 
and frustration among the participants. Power politics in the South is fragile and can impact 
on the reconstruction work of the Government of Sucan. In the transition from a liberation 
movement to a political party tasked with the running of a government bureaucracy, the 
SPLM faces difficulties. Factors such as inflexible leadership, ethnic division and power 
struggles are elements common to any transition. Since the establishement of the 
Government of Southern Sudan, there have been allegations that it is not ethnically 
m Ibid, P 18. 
37-1 "Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead", International Crises Group, 
Africa Report No 106, (31 March 2006), 8. 
m Ibid. 3. 
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representative and that it is dominated by the Dinka. Internal splits within the SPLM 
between the unionists and the separatist, and between Garang's camp and Kiir's camp are 
also a threat to peace. The difference between these two camps surfaced after the death of 
Garang, when Kirr took over the leadership of the SPLM. 
Conclusion 
The CPA has come a long way. It is a development of different initiaties which began as 
early as 1986. Its progress seems to signal that this is a well thought out and coherent 
peace-making process. However, implementing the CPA will need goodwill and 
committment on all sides, and the CPA may not have the commitment of all parties. 
Symptoms of the government's lack of committment to embrace genuine power sharing and 
the SPLM's lack of capacity to meet the challenges of peace-making in post-conflict Sudan are 
visible. International observers, including the International Crises Group (ICG) are 
warning that the government's lack of will, and the SPLM's lack of capacity could 
hamper the implementation of the agreement, including preventing elections which would 
ultimately allow Southem self-determination through a referendum in 2011. 
The problems of mistrust among the participants, and their internal divisions and limited 
resources coupled with the high expectations of the population, are in evidence at the 
moment. The South is already experiencing a capacity and resource shortage in trying to 
establish the basic structures of governance. Such problems could lead to delays in 
implementation of the peace agreement which could then lead to frustration and 
dissatisfaction among interest groups in the country. 
The CPA created a new form of governance whereby the Sudan would function as one 
country with two armies, two governments, two banking systems, two constitutions and 
two administrations. The real challenge in this regard is to make such a complex system 
work while ensuring that national unity is secured. The CPA did not clearly address one 
of the fundamental causes of the conflict - centralized power controlled by the elite. With 
the current structure power is mainly divided between the NCP and the SPLM, the rest 
remain marginalized. By addressing the issues of democracy and political plurality the 
CPA could have ensured a more stable system. 
The regional dimension of the conflict has played an important role in the second civil 
war. What makes the CPA different from the Addis Ababa Agreement is that there is 
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more regional and international interest and engagement III the CPA than there was 
during the negotiations for the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
One of the constraints to pursuing genuine peace during the IGAD peace talks was the 
bilateral conflict between IGAD frontline states, tasked with leading the peace talks, and 
the Sudanese representatives. The CPA is an external initiative while the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was initiated internally and mediated by a third party. As Gerard Prunier 
stated: "Naivasha [the IGAD peace talks] began to turn into a strange theatre when the 
actors appeared driven to compromise more by American pressure than by an inner 
conviction that peace should actually be negotiated.,,376 
As Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and 
Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance and Special Humanitarian 
Coordinator for the Sudan has rightly stated, "There has been no shortage of peace 
processes in Sudan in the past. What has been lacking is the will to sustain those efforts. 
To prevent a repeat of past failures such as the 1972 Addis Ababa accords, we need a 
strategic approach that focuses on key challenges.,,377 
376 Prunier. Darfur. 89. 
371 Andrew Natsios, "Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan", Yale Journal of 
International Affairs, SummerfFall 2005. 
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Conclusion 
In the fifty years that the Sudan existed as an independent state, it has been governed and 
ruled by nine different governments (three civilian, three military and three transitional) 
and under five constitutions. Every authority that seized power in the Sudan promised a 
better future but none have lived up to their promises. 
The Sudanese civil war lasted for almost forty years. In addition to the legacy of colonial 
rule, three of the causes of the conflict are the emergence of the Northern or riverine elite 
at the centre of political power and the failure to of successive constitutions to address the 
relation between state and religion and answers the Southern question. Furthermore, by 
virtue of the duration of the war, it has been difficult to restrict the root causes of the 
conflict to only these factors. With the politicization and manipulation of Sudan's 
diversity - racial, religious, ethnic and cultural - factors related to the conflict have 
expanded beyond the initial causes of the war. Political exclusion of groups and 
ideological warfare have significantly contributed to the complexity of the war, while 
unequal access to natural resources, particularly oil, has led to further complications, 
especially during the second civil war. 
Although both wars were led by Southern movements, the complex nature of the conflict 
has made it difficult to compare the characteristics of the civil wars. Neither the motives 
nor the issues at stake were the same. For instance, while the Anya-Nya fought for the 
secession of the South, SPLM mobilized support in the name of creating a 'New Sudan', 
which draws on the participation of other marginalized groups. 
Although the civil war began in the South, the struggle for change, representation and 
participation in the distribution of power and wealth were issues not confined to this 
region. There have been grievances in Darfur, the eastern region, the Nuba Mountains 
and the Southern Blue Nile. This proves that the Sudanese problem is one beyond the 
North-South conflict. Rather, it is a conflict between the center and periphery, Khartoum 
versus the rest of the country. 
When examining the peace-making process in the Sudan, one can not ignore the 
importance of understanding the factors which led the parties to negotiate. Factors such 
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as internal political turmoil, an economic crisis, increases in military expenditure as well 
as regional and international pressure have all contributed to peace-making efforts in the 
Sudan. Even though both wars were provoked by the government's failure to honour its 
commitment to Southern autonomy, each war and subsequence peace-making process has 
specific characteristics in relation to the nature in which peace was negotiated. 
Negotiations to stop the first civil war were initiated internally. The major factors which 
triggered the peace talks were the cost of the war, and the role and contribution of certain 
individuals. At the time, the cost of war was far greater than that of concessions that were 
likely to come with a peace agreement. Military and political stalemate could only lead to 
escalating costs for the government, and negotiation was the only way out. At the same 
time, personal commitment and the leadership roles played by Abel Alier, Joseph Lagu 
and Jafar Nimeiri can not be ignored. 
Unlike the Addis Ababa talks, the IGAD peace process, was initiated and concluded 
through external pressure. Interest from other countries including the US, Britain, 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, forced the GOS and SPLM to negotiate. The onset of 
Sudan's oil-exporting capacity since the 1990' s brought international interest and 
engagement in the peace process. Another dimension to international involvement was 
the Islamist ideology Khartoum was exporting to its neighbours. This became a threat to 
regional and international security and "the war on terror" were also a critical factor in 
ending the second civil war. As NCP faced diplomatic confrontation, chances of it 
ignoring the international pressure diminished. 
The two peace agreements addressed the fundamental questions which causes the conflict 
differently. While the Addis Ababa Agreement addressed the relationship between the 
two regions it did not explicitly deal with the status of religion vis-a-vis the state. Even 
though the adoption of the concept of Southern autonomy gave the South relative 
independence in its domestic affairs and paved the way for future dealings, it was not 
long before it became apparent that the South was still economically and politically under 
Khartoum. Furthermore, the Addis Ababa Agreement did not have a mechanism which 
guaranteed its protection and sustainability, resulting its failure eleven years later. 
Though it is too early to speculate on the success or failure of the CPA, there are obvious 
problems which could be discussed. Through the Machakos Protocol and the Agreements 
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on Wealth-Sharing and Power-Sharing the CPA addressed many national concerns. 
However, plans for the implementation of the protocols remain complex and vague. The 
Protocol on Power-Sharing contradicts itself by stating that "Cabinet posts and portfolios 
in all clusters, including the National Sovereignty Ministries, shall be shared equitably 
and qualitatively by the two parties [emphasis by author]." Such arrangement shows the 
lack of awareness of the diversity of interests in the country .. Provisions of such nature 
clearly imply that matters of the entire country will be dealt with by the GNU which 
consists of a NCP/SPLM majority with eighty percent representation. Hence the question 
of political and economic marginalization is still not tackled. 
The fact that the CPA kept other parties outside the process makes the peace process 
fragile. Major political groups such as the NDA, PC, Umma, the Communist Party, DUP, 
UDSF, USAP and the Trade Unions and some professions such as lawyers and doctors 
have all been excluded from the process. These exclusions make the agreement seem an 
exclusive deal between the SPLM and NCP and question the comprehensiveness of the 
"Comprehensive Peace Agreement". Most recent evidence of a partial peace deal is the 
unrest in the east and the ongoing conflict in Darfur which cost the lives of up to 400,000 
people in only three years. 
In summary, it is worthwhile to conclude by identifying five important characteristics 
which were prevalent in both peace processes and their implementation. These features 
are also observed in previous failed initiatives. Firstly, the challenge of reaching a 
common understanding on the root causes of the problem was a major obstacle. It is 
evident that the causes of the civil war were understood differently by the parties to the 
conflict, and by observers. It would be ambitious to expect a workable peace agreement 
when there is still disagreement on the root cause of the conflict. Lack of a common 
understanding on the causes of the conflict may lead to difference in perceptions, visions 
and ideas on solutions to the problem. 
Secondly, parties entered into the agreement largely owmg to external and internal 
pressure. Internal political and economic instability was a main reason which led to the 
signing of both agreements. External political environment and economic dynamics, 
including a change in allies, economic dependency and pressure of isolation were some 
of the reasons which pushed the actors to negotiate. The continuance and sustainability of 
peace depends on the party's mutual accountability and sense of responsibility towards 
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their constituencies. In the Sudanese peace process, there is a gap in the representation 
and participation of civil society and interest groups. Implementing the CPA IS a 
challenge without the broader participation and contribution of the Sudanese people. 
Thirdly, if agreements are to last, 'institutionalization' of the peace process becomes 
crucial. Samuel Huntington introduces institutionalization as "the process by which 
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability".378 In other words, once 
agreements are concluded, the crucial challenge will be their continuity in the face of 
time and regime changes. Thus, without incorporating an agreement into national policy 
it would be difficult to guarantee its sustainability. Nimeiri ratified the Addis Ababa 
Agreement as an organic law and incorporated it into the national constitution, but the 
contents of the agreement were not fully internalized. 
Fourthly, peace agreements driven by personalities will remam fragile once these 
personalities are no longer in power. The Addis Ababa Agreement could not have 
happened without the goodwill of Nimeiri, Alier and Lagu. Similarly, the CPA would not 
have been accomplished if it was not for Taha and Garang who directly negotiated the 
bulk of the agreement. These individuals have played a significant role in sustaining the 
peace processes. As Nelson Kasfir said, the success of the agreement would only be 
measured by its acceptance by the constituencies the parties represent. 379 The 
commitment negotiators bring to a process can be lost in their absence. A case in point is 
the uncertainty the current peace agreement faces after the death of Garang. 
Lastly, both the Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA were concluded in the form of a 
bilateral process which narrowly focused on Southern representatives and the demands of 
government. Such a narrow focus has sidelined other marginalized groups who are still 
victims of Khartoum's negligence. The strategy of undertaking peace talks at a bilateral 
level has left the broader national problem unresolved. The agreement therefore lacks the 
nationwide dimension that would make it genuinely able to solve the Sudanese problem. 
As Santino Aher arop bol, a Sudanese refugee, rightly observed, what Sudan needs is not 
a plan for ending wars, but one for solving them:18o 
378 Samuel Huntington, Political Orders in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1968), 8-24. 
379 Kasfir, Southem Sudanese, 144 - 148 
.180 "Using the Past to Build the Future: The lost boys" Santino Aher Arop Bol, 
http://www.kushworJd.org/lostboyspagel.html. [accessed 15 August 2006). 
87 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Appendix 1 
Provinces in the Sudan 
1956 1983 (8 ) - provlllces 
Northern Region Southern Region 
Northern Province Bahr el-Ghazal 
Kassala Province Equatoria 
Kordofan Province Upper Nile 
Darfur Province 
Blue Nile Province 
1983 1994 (18 ) - J2rovlllces 
Northern Region Southern Region 
Upper Blue Nile Eastern Equatoria 
Blue Nile Western Equatoria 
Kassala Bahr el-Ghazal 
Khartoum Upper Nile 
Southern Kordofan Lakes 
Northern Kordofan Jonglei 
Southern Darfur 
Northern Darfur 
White Nile 
Northern 
Nile 
Red Sea 
1994 - Present (26 Provinces) 
Northern Region Southern Region 
Upper Blue Nile Eastern Equatoria 
Blue Nile Western Equatoria 
Kassala Bahr el-Jabal 
Khartoum Northern Bahr el-Ghazal 
Southern Kordofan Western Bahr el-Ghazal 
Northern Kordofan Warrab 
Western Kordofan Unity 
Southern Darfur Upper Nile 
Northern Darfur Lakes 
White Nile Jonglei 
Northern 
Nile 
Red Sea 
Sennar 
Gedaref 
EI Gezira 
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Appendix 2 
Government in the Sudan: 1956 - 2006 
No. Year Leader Type of Government 
1. 1956 - 1958 PM. Abd Allah Khalil 1 sl Democratic Period 
2. 1958-1964 Major General Ibrahim Military Government 
Abbud 
3. 1964 - 1965 Sirr al-Khatim al- Transitional Civilian 
Khalifa Government 
4. 1965 - 1969 Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi 2nd Democratic Period 
5. 1969 - 1985 Colonel Ja'far Nimeri Military Government 
6. 1985 - 1986 Lieutenant General Interim Government 
Abdar Rahman Siwar 
ad-Dhahab 
7. 1986 - 1989 Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi 3ro Democratic Period 
8. 1989 - 2005 General Omar Hassan Military Government 
al-Bashir 
9. 2005 - Present General Omar Hassan Interim Government 
al-Bashir 
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Appendix 3 
Extract from the book "Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured" by 
Abel Alier, 1992 (p. 64-66) 
Abel Alier presented Numeiri with policy recommendation based on 9th June 
Declaration and previous deliberations on the subject, most importantly the 1965 
Round-table Conference. From these documents emerged eleven points which guided 
discussions with Anya-Nya. These are: 
1. Government was asked to reaffirm its determination to abide by 9th June 
Declaration. 
2. Amnesty law would be extended to Southerners previously or currently 
involved in acts and omissions contrary to the laws of the country. 
3. Citizens in the South would be responsible for local affairs III regional 
administration, local government the police and prison forces. 
4. Central government would be committed to the principle of guaranteeing 
citizens their political and socio-economic rights. 
5. Whatever is agreed upon in respect of internal self-government in the South, 
would be embodied in the country's constitution. 
6. Exclusive jurisdiction of the central government would include External 
Affairs, National defence, Economic and Educational Planning, 
Communication and Telecommunication, currency and coinage, Nationality 
and Immigration. 
Alier justifies this as 'essential to define areas of sovereignty which the 
Southern region would not claim and which would not be negotiable in the 
process of dialogue. 
7. Returnees including those fighting against the government and politicians in 
exile would be entitled to participate fully and unconditionally in political, 
economic and social work at central and regional government levels. 
8. Returnees will be resettled in their original homes, and agricultural and other 
projects of an economic nature will be provided for the socio-economic 
welfare of the Southern Sudan. 
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9. General rehabilitation of those displaced as a result of rebellion will be 
guaranteed. 
10. The government calls upon all citizens to abandon all acts of violence and 
blood-shed and work for fruitful socio-economic development to fight 
poverty, ignorance and disease. 
11. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister, 
and the Chairman of the Constitution Committee have gone through these 
points and are fully in agreement with them. 
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